ScholarOne - Post-conflict power-sharing and Lower-tier Insurgents

dipak banjade¹

¹Texas Tech University System

April 01, 2024

Abstract

Studies have shown post-conflict power-sharing as one of the important institutional aspects of post-conflict peace. However, these studies are yet to explain why and how lower-tier insurgents can play an influential role during and after the power-sharing peace deals. The most important aspect about them is that they are the rational actors whose interests in 'selective incentives' are more likely to make them weigh post-power sharing terms in terms of their cost-benefit analysis. The central argument of this paper is that conflicts incurring a higher cost for the lower-tier insurgent is more likely to survive a peaceful transition only when their concern of 'selective incentives' has been taken care of. With a statistical analysis of the Power-sharing Event Datasets (PSED) of Ottomonn and Vullers (2015), this paper has found support for this argument.

Hosted file

Hosted file

Hosted file
Post-conflict power-sharing and Lower-tier Insurgents

Abstract:

Studies have shown post-conflict power-sharing as one of the important institutional aspects of post-conflict peace. However, these studies are yet to explain why and how lower-tier insurgents can play an influential role during and after the power-sharing peace deals. The most important aspect about them is that they are the rational actors whose interests in ‘selective incentives’ are more likely to make them weigh post-power sharing terms in terms of their cost-benefit analysis. The central argument of this paper is that conflicts incurring a higher cost for the lower-tier insurgent is more likely to survive a peaceful transition only when their concern of 'selective incentives' has been taken care of. With a statistical analysis of the Power-sharing Event Datasets (PSED) of Ottomonn and Vullers (2015), this paper has found support for this argument.

Keywords: Lower-tier insurgents, Sunk Cost, Selective Incentives, Post-conflict Power-sharing,
**Introduction**

Almost all the relevant literature on civil conflicts has explained civil conflict in terms of causes and solutions. Literature on the causes has pointed out social, economic, and political grievances and opportunities as major causative factors of the conflict (Buhaug 2005, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2011). Likewise, studies on the solutions have mostly stressed the importance of inclusive and democratic institutional mechanisms to foster the political mainstreaming of the rival groups (Ishiyama & Shliek 2020, Joshi 2013, Morgenbesser, 2017). In this regard, post-conflict power-sharing has been discussed as one of the important aspects of the peace process. The relevant explanations argue that rebel groups are more likely to come into the peace process only when their incentives are secured, and they are confident against the fear of constant marginalization and possible future repressions (Joshi 2013).

However, these studies have overlooked that there could be multiple stakeholders in any insurgency, and their incentives also vary. Any civil conflict might have mainly three types of stakeholders on the rebel side: elites, common people, and lower-tier insurgents. Among these, the lower-tier insurgents are the ones who not only incur a sunk cost (i.e., getting involved in the conflict and making sacrifices) but are also in a position to spoil the peace process given their military ability if their concern of ‘selective incentives’ have not been taken care of. It is because they are the rational actors who tend to weigh post-power-sharing terms in terms of their cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, a costly civil conflict means that the lower-tier insurgents are more likely to be assertive in their incentives during the post-conflict peace process.

The study will contribute to the literature by conceptualizing the stakeholders of insurgency and elucidating why and how to take care of lower-tier insurgents. The empirical analysis of this article includes the Power-sharing Event Datasets (PSED) of Ottoman and Vullers (2015). This
dataset includes all the power-sharing event datasets from 1989 to 2006 from 41 countries that experienced civil conflicts and peace deals afterward. The ensuing section of this paper will start with a review of the literature on civil conflicts. The following sections will conceptualize the stakeholders of insurgency and explain why and how the 'selective incentives' of the lower-tier insurgents play an influential role during the power-sharing peace deals. The research design and results section is designed to test the theories in the paper. The conclusion section will sum up the major arguments of this paper along with a brief discussion on the possible policy-level implications of the findings.

**Civil Conflict: Causes and solutions.**

The relevant literature has tried to answer what causes civil conflicts and what are the major solutions for them. Studies on the causes have focused on the aspects of grievances and opportunities. Whereas studies on solutions have focused on institutional aspects.

Literature on the causes of civil conflicts has pointed out that social, economic, and political grievances and opportunities are the ones that trigger conflicts (Buhaug 2005, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2011). Economic grievances are associated with relative economic marginalization and backwardness, whereas economic opportunities are related to exploiting the concentration of natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Le Billon 2001, Ross 2004, Weinstein 2005). Likewise, political grievances are mainly associated with the loss of relative share in the political power, whereas political opportunities are related to the relative advantage of harvesting the vacuum of political crisis as in the cases of the breakdown of Yugoslavia and Russia (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, Buhaug, Cederman, and Rod 2008). Similarly, Social grievances and opportunities are associated with distinct identities manifested in the form of religion, ethnicity, culture, language, and regionality, where 'strategic interaction'
among the actors helps to meet the cost associated with conflicts as in the case of 'sons of the soil'
(Weidmann 2009, Staniland 2012, Fearon and Laitin 2011)

Literature on solutions has focused on institutional aspects necessary for post-conflict stability. There are mainly two sorts of arguments: One, peace can be restored either through a complete victory from either side of the separation of rebel-controlled territory and allowing it to function in a sovereign way (Tuft 2010, Kaufmann 1996, Ari 2023). Second, more inclusive policies can help countries to tackle conflict-related grievances and opportunism (Ishiyama & Shliek 2020, Joshi 2013). Democratic institutions such as proportional representation, parliamentarian system, and power-sharing are some of the mechanisms that are more likely to ensure every grieving group's access to political processes i.e. access to policy and resources in a relatively sustainable way (Miklian 2008, Ishiyama & Shliek 2020, Joshi 2013). In sum, literature has been focused on how to better address the grievances of the conflicting groups for post-conflict stability.

Since this paper is about post-conflict power-sharing, the following section will talk more about the literature on post-conflict power-sharing.

*Post Conflict Power-sharing as a solution*

Post-conflict power-sharing has remained one of the most important parts of post-conflict stability. "Power-sharing is an arrangement commonly implemented in post-conflict settings whereby parties to a conflict are formally and simultaneously involved in the key decision-making of government (P3, Miklian 2008)". During the peace process, negotiating parties try to reach an agreement that stipulates a guarantee to the combatant's position in at least one of the branches of government (Walter 2002, Jarstad 2009). It’s because the fear of constant marginalization and possible future repressions might discourage the rebel groups from coming into the peace process
and supporting democratic transitions unless they are confident enough that their political incentives can be achieved through an inclusive institution (Joshi 2013, Walter 2002, Jarstad 2009).

Power-sharing creates mechanisms that ensure access to resources over which the fighting has raged. Bastard (2009) and Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) have identified four types of power-sharing: military, economic, political, and territorial. In military power-sharing, lower-tier insurgents get recruited into the regular national army. In political power-sharing, the rebel leaders can secure executive-level positions in the national government. Likewise, Territorial power-sharing ensures federal autonomy. Similarly, economic power-sharing ensures autonomy over some economic or natural resources.

In sum, the fundamental logic is that power-sharing promotes peace since such a peace process ensures a guaranteed inclusion of the stakeholders through consociational democracy (Lijphart 1993). Therefore, the more power-sharing provisions are included in an agreement, the higher the likelihood that peace will endure (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, p 319).

However, these studies are yet to explain why and how lower-tier insurgents can play an influential role during and after the power-sharing peace deals. The lower-tier insurgents are the ones who have not only incurred sunk costs (i.e., getting involved in the conflict and making sacrifices) but are the rational actors whose ‘selective incentives’ are more likely to make them weigh post-conflict power-sharing terms in terms of their cost-benefits. Therefore, the higher the sunk cost is, the more likely these insurgents are to be assertive over a clear provision of their incentives during the post-conflict peace process.

The following paragraphs will explain more about who are the lower-tier insurgents and how and why they can play an influential role in post-conflict stability and power sharing.
Who are the lower-tier insurgents?

To understand who are the lower-tier insurgents of the rebel groups, we need to understand the overall stakeholders in the rebel organizations first. There are usually three sorts of stakeholders in rebel groups: the elites of the insurgency, common people, and fighters who hold the lower tier of the organization. The elites are the ones who organize insurgents but usually do not directly get involved in the frontline of war. Their task is to keep the insurgents motivated and mobilized when appropriate and to manage the resources needed for the insurgency. The whole organization of the insurgency gives foremost attention to the safety of the given leadership value. Therefore, even though they are likely to be equipped with arms and ammunition, they usually do not directly engage in the frontline of the combat war.

The second stakeholder of the insurgency is the common people. The rebels try to maximize support from their civilian base whose interest they represent, and they rely on these civilians for sanctuary, provisions, information, and other resources (from Wood 2010 Mason, 1996: 66; Migdal, 1974: 41-51). These people are not directly involved in the combat but most often undergo trouble during a conflict. Shesterinina (2022) writes “Social ties and identities that link these groups to their internal and external bases of support can form in the pre-war period, including in the course of observation of and participation in everyday confrontation, nonviolent contention, and violent opposition.” Therefore, civil conflict is a “social process” because of the centrality of “strategic interaction between rival actors, and between these actors and the population,” in the dynamics of territorial control that shape the evolution of civil wars (Kalyvas, 2008: 1061, 1063).

The third stakeholder is the lower-tier insurgents. They are armed fighters who hold lower-tier positions in the rebel organization. Unlike the elites who direct the rebellion, these lower-tier
insurgents are the ones who not only do their best to protect the leaders but also directly engage in combat wars. These people play an active role by taking their lives at stake. They are the ones who have not only incurred the cost of getting involved in the conflict and making sacrifices but are also more likely to possess the ability to punish their leaders if they deviate from the interest of the lower-tier insurgents. Such an ability mainly comes from their military experience, the arms they hold, and the coordinated mechanism that have already accessed. As a result, the elites of the insurgency are more likely to be equally cautious of these lower-tier insurgents and, consequently, more likely to ensure the means of taking care of the welfare and specific incentives during the negotiation stage.

**How do the lower-tier insurgents play an influential during the peace process?**

The lower-tier insurgents are mainly important for carrying out violent conflicts. However, such an assumption might trigger the question of why some people choose the costly game of being involved in violent activities while others abstain. Do they have any social incentives? How can these incentives be served during the post-conflict power-sharing?

These questions are important for the reason that civil wars are fought for multiple incentives i.e., economic, political, and ideological gains. And there are multiple stakeholders whose incentives might vary over policy positions. While the elites might favor higher-level government positions during post-conflict power-sharing, the common people may look for policies that serve them all indiscriminately. Similarly, the lower-tier insurgents also might have specific incentives given the cost they have borne during the conflict.

To better understand why and how the lower-tier insurgents' incentives can play an influential role during post-conflict power-sharing and stability, we need to understand the concept under the sunk cost and selective incentives.
Sunk cost.

The idea of sunk cost is that people tend to continue an effort if they have already invested a certain amount of time and resources (Arkes and Ayton, 1999). As per the theory, once people have sunk their costs for a particular goal, they are more likely to keep striving for the goal even if they might lose from this strive (Arkes and Ayton, 1999; Moon, 2001). Therefore, Schott (et. al. 2011) write that sunk costs are irrecoverable investments that should not govern future decisions from a normative standpoint. During civil conflicts, the lower-tier insurgents are the ones who incur sunk costs i.e., getting involved in conflict and making sacrifices. They get involved in carrying out violent activities that can potentially kill or wound themselves. They sacrifice not only their time, energy, and resources but also their dear ones and friends. As a result, these very people are more likely to be more sensitive to their grievances.

Therefore, we can assume that the lower-tier insurgents can potentially spoil a peace process if their grievances are not addressed. By spoiling the peace process, they might even have more to lose. However, their concern of personal grievances and sunk cost might interact to keep striving until their selective incentives are ensured (Greenhill 2006). Any public goods brought by a peace deal are more likely to be enjoyed indiscriminately by the whole society regardless of who paid more or less. But, despite the policy incentives brought by the peace deal that can benefit a large population, these people are also likely to seek selective incentives i.e., some private goods that can better address the disequilibrium amount of the price they paid.

Selective incentives

‘Why do some individuals take extraordinary risks by choosing to participate in armed conflict?’ (Sesay 2004). The question is important for the reason there always exists a classic “free rider” problem (Viterna, 2013: 42). The fundamental argument of the ‘free rider’ problem is that if
the benefits of common goods do not depend on participation, people are often tempted to ‘free ride’ on the expectation that others will participate (Olson 1965). This means common incentives are not sufficient to motivate participants.

People join an insurgency only when they are being offered ‘selective incentives’ (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Weinstein, 2007). The argument is that people are tempted to defect from participation if the outcome provides equal benefits to all regardless of participation. It means people are rational actors who tend to take risks only when the risk pays them with 'selective incentives' that otherwise would not be available to them (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Weinstein, 2007). Studies have shown that even those motivated by political ideologies behave rationally, they tend to compare the risks of participating with the value and probability of acquiring benefits (Mason, 1989; Tullock, 1971). Therefore Popkin (1979) argues that a crucial revolutionary strategy is to offer incentives to revolutionaries contingent on their participation. Similarly, Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) even argue that it is not ideological conversion that plays a principal role in mobilizing guerrilla armies but the collective and selective goods.

Therefore, as stated earlier, we assume that the insurgents are likely not to join a conflict if they can enjoy the ultimate benefits without joining it. It means, that once joined, they are more likely to assertively look for ‘selective incentives’ when incentives are being paid out.

**Concern for Sunk cost and ‘selective incentives during post-conflict power-sharing.**

A post-conflict power-sharing deal does not necessarily mean that it will bring selective private goods to all the stakeholders as they might have expected. The overall peace process includes negotiations on some major policy decisions and sharing power in the government.

Elites are mainly concerned about their positions in the power-sharing government as this is the tool through which they can access resources needed to strengthen their positions further.
Besides, through a strong position in government, they can also maintain their control over how major policy decisions are to be carried out. Likewise, the common people are mainly concerned with major policy decisions of their concern. These policies are the mechanisms to address these people's grievances and concerns and to minimize the probability of people's support in future conflict.

However, As mentioned earlier, any public goods brought by a peace deal are more likely to be enjoyed indiscriminately by the whole society regardless of who paid more or less. But, despite the policy incentives brought by the peace deal that can benefit a large population, the lower-tier insurgents are also likely to seek selective incentives i.e., some private goods that can better address the disequilibrium amount of the price they paid by getting engaged into the frontline of conflict.

Therefore, unless a substantive and tangible achievement is made in terms of taking care of insurgents with selective incentives, the new phenomenon may only make them spoil the peace process (Greenhill 2006). Horowitz (1985) writes that the lower-ranking cadres can signal their leaders the potential costs of ignoring them by signaling their ability to spoil the peace process. It means if the concern of lower-tier insurgents is not addressed, they are more likely to engage in spoiling post-conflict peace.

**Hypothesis 1:**

Taking care of special incentives for the lower-tier insurgents is more likely to reduce post-conflict hazards.

However, given the possibility that the peace deals involve an intensive negotiation process, it is highly likely that both sides may have to make several compromises on many of their
major policy choices and demands. Therefore, it triggers the question of when the lower-tier insurgents are more likely to see their concern of 'selective incentives' be addressed.

Since the lower-tier insurgents are rational actors (Olson 1965), their desire for selective incentives might be higher and firmer when they have already incurred a high sink for the conflict. It means when conflict has already turned violent costing human lives and economic disadvantages, the lower-tier insurgents are more likely to look for greater private goods. Studies have shown that those not satisfied with the terms of an agreement are more likely to engage in spoiling the peace process (Stedman 1997). Under such a scenario, the roles of leaders from both sides of the negotiating team are equally important.

During the peace process followed by violent conflicts, the ‘sunk cost’ might serve as a two-edged weapon.

On one hand, insurgent leaders also bear high pressure to accommodate the interests of their subordinates when they have already incurred high costs. When the sunk cost is low, they might convince their subordinates with the terms of common goods. But, once a high sunk cost has been incurred, such an ability to persuade with common goods might also diminish. The relevant literature has argued that political leaders incur culpability by getting involved in costly conflicts (Croco 2011). Consequently, such leaders are most likely to be punished for deviating from the public interests (McAvoy, 2006, Ostrom et al. 2018). Here, such a situation is more likely applicable to insurgent groups since they are representing specific interest groups, and the leaders of such groups are equally likely to be accountable to the group as a whole, and likely to be punished by their fellow group members. Unlike the democratic system, where the audience costs are paid through elections, the punishment of insurgent leaders could be even harsher given the undemocratic nature of their institutions. As a result, insurgency leaders are more likely to be
sensitive to addressing such costs particularly when the sunk costs are high. Similarly, on the other hand, those who represent the state have the pressure of accommodating maximum flexibility to the welfare of the lower-tier insurgents for not letting them spoil the hard-earned peace process.

Therefore, we can assume that the higher the sunk cost the lower-tier insurgents pay, the higher will be for the expectation for 'selective incentives'.

**Hypothesis 2:**

A Post post-conflict power-sharing deal followed by a higher sunk cost on the Rebel side is more likely to address the interests of 'selective incentives' for the lower-tier insurgents.

However, one may argue that it is the 'selective incentives' of the leaders that dictate the post-conflict stability. Given that political power-sharing serves the interests of particularly the rebel leaders, they may be more likely to spoil the peace process if they see any threat to their share in the government. It's because elites tend to prefer to continue to hold key positions in the government that allows them significant leverage over public resources. As a result, whenever there is any possibility of being ousted from the government, they are more likely to mobilize their subordinates to spoil the peace process. Moreover, since these leaders have already demonstrated manipulating power by persuading several people to fight under them, we cannot negate the possibility that the rebel leaders can spoil the peace process anytime and the lower-tier insurgents will just follow the order of their leader even if their 'selective incentives' have been taken care of. Under such situations, the lower-tier insurgents might perceive the 'selective incentives' as something unsustainable.

In sum, the post-conflict power-sharing might need a probation period after which the lower-tier insurgents are less likely to defect if their leaders want to defect. This period not only
assures the lower-tier insurgents about the sustainability of their 'selective incentives', but also allows other terms under the peace agreement to be implemented. As a result, neither the lower-tier insurgents nor the common people have any further grievances/incentives to be engaged in the escalation of the conflict. To say, after a period of post-conflict power-sharing that consists of the rebel group, stability is more likely to occur regardless of whether the elites of the rebel groups are in executive power or not.

Therefore,

**Hypothesis 3:**

The 'selective incentives' of the elite are more likely to become less salient over time if the `selective incentives’ of the lower-tier insurgents have been taken care of.

**Research Design**

My unit of analysis will be the government rebel dyad in the post-conflict period. I will use the Power-sharing Event Datasets (PSED) of Ottomonn and Vullers (2015). This dataset includes all the power-sharing event datasets from 1989 to 2006 for 41 countries. All these events are related to peace deals followed by civil conflicts. I chose these particular datasets for two reasons: One, the dataset has included information on whether or not these power-sharing agreements were implemented during the next 60 months from the date of the agreement. In many cases, promised power-sharing peace deals are spoiled before they are even implemented. An implemented peace deal means the concerns of stakeholders have been met as agreed. Two, the datasets have categorized power-sharing based on characteristics: territorial, political, economic, and military. Here, military power sharing is more likely to serve the interests of lower-tier instruments. It is because once they get appointed as a regular army of the state, they will have a regular source of
income and allowances. It is possible that the lower-tier insurgents are also likely to benefit from other power-sharing provisions, but military power-sharing is the one tool that serves their interest in 'selective incentive' in an exclusive way.

**Dependent Variable:**

For the first hypothesis, my dependent variable will be Post Conflict Hazard. I will be measuring this variable with ‘End of the Analysis Time’ (i.e., pcmEND) from PSED with binary values: ‘1’ for conflict recurrence, and ‘0’ for non-recurrence). And, I will be using the Kaplan-Meier hazard ratio method. This variable can capture how likely the peace deal is to be sustained after the interests of lower-tier insurgents have been taken care of.

For my second hypothesis, my dependent variable will be military power-sharing. As stated in an earlier paragraph, such a provision is more likely to be one of the effective ways to protect the welfare and incentives of the insurgents by ensuring a salary-based job. Moreover, military power-sharing is one of the major concerns during the negotiation period as it is also a means of protecting elites from strategic vulnerability in the wake of the new political environment. I will use the logit method to measure the first hypothesis because of the binary values of the dependent variable.

**Explanatory Variables:**

To test the first hypothesis, my main explanatory variable will be political power sharing. It's because the peace deals addressing the interest of the lower-tier insurgents are expected to sustain better than the peace deals focused exclusively on the interest of the higher-tier insurgents or the insurgent leaders. I will also be creating separate models with political power-sharing as an explanatory variable. It will help us to analyze the strength of military power sharing in a more comparative form.
For the second hypothesis, my main explanatory variable will be 'sunk cost'. However, I will measure this variable as ‘intensity of conflict’ at the dyad level from the PSED dataset. The variable is coded with values '0' for low intensity (i.e., for less than 1000 battle-related deaths), and '1' for high intensity (i.e., for more than 1000 battle-related deaths) as per the Uppsala Conflict Program. One obvious aspect of the number of battle-related deaths is that such a high number of killings in the battlefields is going to create an enormous amount of psychological and physical level stress or preparedness among those who are directly involved in it. Therefore, we can assume that a high-intensity conflict means a higher level of sunk cost incurred by the insurgents.

**Control variables**

I have used the ‘UNPKO' variable with binary values with '1' suggesting the presence of peacekeepers and '0' for no peacekeeping forces. The variable is important because several times the presence of foreign peacekeeping forces helps to sustain the peace process. I have also included ‘Incompatibility’ with binary values: ‘0’ for the government issue, and ‘1’ for the territorial issue. The variable helps to capture the effect of territorial issues which are likely to spiral into further conflicts more often. I have also included the variable 'Multiple Rebels signing the agreement'. The involvement of multiple rebel groups in the peace process is more likely to sustain the peace process.

**Results**

Table 1 shows that both promised and implemented military power-sharing have a negative hazard ratio. Model 2 in Table 1 shows that promised military power-sharing is more likely to reduce the hazard by 190%. Likewise, Model 4 shows that the implemented military power-sharing is more likely to reduce the hazard by 270%. Whereas political power-sharing (i.e., both
implemented and promised ones) doesn't have any such statistically significant effect on peace deals. It means taking care of the insurgents is one of the strongest ways of ensuring post-conflict stability. This evidence supports my first hypothesis that taking care of the specific incentives of lower-tier insurgents is more likely to reduce the post-conflict hazard.

Besides, UNPKO is more likely to reduce the conflict hazard only when it is accounted for with implemented military power-sharing (i.e., Model 4). It means UNPKO can better serve its purpose when the interest and welfare of the lower-tier insurgents have been taken care of. One reason could be that the presence of UN peacekeeping forces is more likely to reduce any possible sunk cost and audience cost. It’s because UNPKO usually serves as a middle ground between the government and insurgents. Likewise, Incompatibility is more likely to reduce the conflict hazard when there is military sharing (i.e., Model 2 and Model 4). It implies that even though it may be hard to secure military power-sharing in territorial issues, territorial issue-related peace deals are more likely to sustain the peace deal only when it has ensured the interest of the insurgents. However, the variable 'Multiple Rebels Signing the Peace Agreements' indicates that conflict hazard is highly likely when there is any sort of power-sharing. It seems this is caused by the situation as in "Too many cooks spoil the broth".
Table 1: Hazard Ratios of power-sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Analysis time when the record ends</th>
<th>(2) Analysis time when the record ends</th>
<th>(3) Analysis time when the record ends</th>
<th>(4) Analysis time when the record ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promised Political Power-sharing</td>
<td>0.352 (0.301)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>-0.484 (0.342)</td>
<td>-0.281 (0.340)</td>
<td>-0.427 (0.337)</td>
<td>-0.591* (0.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rebels Signing Peace Agreement</td>
<td>1.189*** (0.314)</td>
<td>1.384*** (0.300)</td>
<td>1.329*** (0.299)</td>
<td>1.311*** (0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>-0.719 (0.513)</td>
<td>-1.474*** (0.513)</td>
<td>-0.821 (0.510)</td>
<td>-0.986* (0.509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promised Military Power-sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.907*** (0.314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented Political Power-sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.321 (0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented Military Power-sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.712*** (1.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.279*** (0.276)</td>
<td>-4.295*** (0.268)</td>
<td>-5.093*** (0.260)</td>
<td>-4.890*** (0.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)

Both the models in Table 2 show that a higher sunk cost (as measured by intensity of conflict) is more likely to lead to military power-sharing. Model 1 suggests that a higher-intensity conflict is nearly 3 times more likely to ensure promised military power-sharing compared to the peace deal followed by a lower-intensity conflict. Likewise, model 2 shows that a high-intensity conflict is 7.6 times more likely to ensure the actual implementation of military power-sharing. Similarly, figure 1 also shows that the marginal effect of promised and implemented political power-sharing (PS) has remained higher and positive on the military power-sharing (implemented) when the dyad intensity of conflict is high. It means post-conflict power-sharing followed by high-intensity conflict is more likely to include the 'selective incentives' for the lower-tier insurgents. Therefore, this evidence supports my second hypothesis that the conflicts that have incurred a high
sunk cost are more likely to see a positive and stronger effect on the protection of the welfare and specific incentives (i.e., through military power-sharing) of the lower-tier insurgents.

Table 2: Impact of Audience & Sunk Cost on Power-sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Promised Military Power-sharing</th>
<th>(2) Implemented Military Power-sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Conflict (Sunk Cost)</td>
<td>2.977***</td>
<td>7.565***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
<td>0.525***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0543)</td>
<td>(0.0606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rebels Signing Peace Agreement</td>
<td>0.835**</td>
<td>0.696***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0731)</td>
<td>(0.0785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>0.109***</td>
<td>0.191***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
<td>(0.0282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.057***</td>
<td>0.157***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.0125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>3,821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 1 shows the odds odd ratios of the models, (seEform in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1 shows that peace deals are more likely to be sustained over the years when military power-sharing has been implemented along with political power-sharing. The results show that such an effect is especially evident after the second year. Figure 2 shows that the peace deals are less likely to be sustained for the first four years if implemented military power-sharing does not concur with political power-sharing. However, from the fifth year, implemented military power-sharing is more likely to survive the post-conflict stability despite political power-sharing being implemented. This result supports my third hypothesis that insurgent leaders can no longer spoil the peace process even if they are not in executive power anymore since the stakes of the lower-tier insurgents have been taken care of for a substantial period.
Conclusion

This paper has tried to answer why and how peace deals are more likely to ensure special incentives for the lower-tier insurgents. The paper has identified an insurgency into three groups: one, the general people who do not directly participate in the conflict but whose incentives are being represented by the insurgents; two, insurgent leaders who lead the conflict; and third, lower-tier insurgents who directly participate in the conflicts. Out of these, the role of lower-tier insurgents is important because they not only incur a sunk cost by participating in the conflict, but they are also the ones able to be more make their leaders accountable.

The paper finds that peace deals are more likely to ensure the welfare and special incentives of the lower-tier insurgents especially when the sunk cost is high. Moreover, the peace deals, that address the 'special incentives' of the lower-tier insurgents, have a lower hazard rate.
Besides, the paper also finds that the effect of political power-sharing is inevitable to institutionalize the peace process only for the first few years. This means that the insurgent leaders can spoil the peace process if their access to the executive mechanism is hindered only when the peace process is fresh (i.e., in the first few years). However, after a period, the ability of the insurgent leaders diminishes if the welfare and specific incentives of the lower-tier insurgents have been taken care of. The findings in the paper could be useful for countries that have been suffering from high-intensity conflicts. Proper attention to conflict resolution mechanisms can address some of the fundamental problems of the peace process.
Reference


Stephen John Stedman; Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *International Security* 1997; 22 (2): 5–53. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.5


