A Millennium After al-Farabī; Notes on’Allāma abāabā’ī’s Political Philosophy

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Abstract

It is essential to ask why there is so little attention paid to political philosophy among these scholars? Or, if there is, why does it remain a minor or marginal conversation? Did they consider the discussion on governance under the other areas of their expertise, such as jurisprudence (Fiqh)? And, if yes, what motivated them to do so? Or, at least in Shia Islam, did this arise from their general belief that if there is an Imam, he is the right person to govern the community, and if we are in the occultation era, then our only choice is to wait for the Imam to return? Consequently, there is no need to philosophize an ideal society, an occurrence of which only happens with the presence of an Imam. Clarifying the questions mentioned above requires another investigation. We leave these questions aside here and focus instead on contemporary Shia philosophers to examine their thoughts on political philosophy, Utopia, or any discussion of governance. Our goal is to identify the al-Fārābīan heritage of the Islamic intellectual tradition in a more recent period.
A Millennium After al-Farabī;
Notes on ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Political Philosophy

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Keywords: al-Fārābī; political philosophy; Governance; ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī;

Al-Fārābīan Heritage

In the history of Islamic philosophy, al-Fārābī1 (872-950) is well known for theorizing and philosophizing about the ideal society or Utopia. In his various works such as Ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍīla (The Ideas of People of the Perfect Society), he claims that man’s happiness is achieved through a perfect human society, which he compares to a sound body. In such a virtuous society, the perfect philosopher is identical to a prophet. This also might be compared with Chinese Confucian terminology in calling the prophet a Sage. This statement suggests the identity of philosophy and revelation in al-Fārābī’s thought. It is on this ground that he expounds his political philosophy.

1 For more on al-Farabi’s philosophy see Peter Adamson, "In the age of al-Fārābī: Arabic philosophy in the fourth-tenth century," ed. Peter Adamson (London: Warburg Institute, 2008), 7.
Thus, we agree with Muhsin Mahdi when he mentions that al-Fārābī’s primary concerns, as revealed by his surviving works, are with logic and political philosophy.

Al- Fārābī is claimed to be the first Muslim political philosopher. Nevertheless, the path of the Fārābīan tradition of conceptualizing and philosophizing Utopia seems to be ambiguous in the history of Islamic intellectual tradition. Ibn Sinā (980-1037), Suhrawardī (1154–1191), and Mullā Ṣadrā (1571-1636) are among the most significant Muslim philosophers. Though they wrote extensively on metaphysics and other philosophical questions, they did not independently write on Utopia. Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy begins from natural philosophy but continues into the metaphysics and discussions over God’s attributes and Being. Suhrwardī, on the other hand, describes his philosophy as a philosophy of Illumination or al-falsafa al-Ishrāq, in which metaphysics, cosmology, and ontology in a traditional sense are discussed. Mulla Sadra, in his Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikma al-Muta’āliya fi aāfar al-arba’a al-Aqliya), introduces his philosophy with a discussion on “being qua being” and “primacy of Being” (Wujūd) over “quiddity” (Māhīya). He later proceeds to spiritual psychology (’ilm al-Nafs) to describe and philosophize the Circle of Existence (al-Dā’irat al-Wujūd) from its beginning and the arc of descent (al-Qalṣ Nuzūl) to the return or arc of ascent (al-Qaws al-Su’ūd). It seems that there is no specific chapter for political philosophy in Sadra’s philosophy as well.

It is essential to ask why there is so little attention paid to political philosophy among these scholars? Or, if there is, why does it remain a minor or marginal conversation? Did they consider the discussion on governance under the other areas of their expertise, such as jurisprudence (Fiqh)? And, if yes, what motivated them to do so? Or, at least in Shia Islam, did this arise from their general belief that if there is an Imam, he is the right person to govern the community, and if we are in the occultation era, then our only choice is to wait for the Imam to return? A result of which is that there is no need to philosophize an ideal society, an occurrence of which only happens with the presence of an Imam.

Clarifying the questions mentioned above requires another investigation. We leave these questions aside here and focus instead on contemporary Shia philosophers to examine their thoughts on political philosophy, Utopia, or any discussion of governance. Our goal is to identify the al-Fārābīan heritage of the Islamic intellectual tradition in a more recent period. The general assumption on the relationship between Shi’ite Islam and governance in our contemporary and post-occultation milieu is significantly colored by Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of the Wilāyat al-Faqīh (The Guardianship of the Jurist). Ahmad Vāezī, a contemporary scholar of Shia political thought, describes this theory as "the central axis of contemporary Shi’a political thought."3 This theory, which was employed and practiced following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran and embodied in its constitution, has theoretical roots in the works of scholars such as Mulla Ahmad Narāqī (1771-1772 –1829). Mulla Ahmad

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Narāqī, in his `Awāyid al-Ayyām, was the first Shi’ite scholar of pre-Modern Iran to establish the authority of the religious jurist whom the Imams appealed to during the Iranian constitutional revolution. His only legal work was referred to by Khumayni [sic] in support of his theory of the sovereignty of the jurist. Khomeini, in his Islamic Government, illustrates the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Vilāyat al-faqīh) as being self-evident:

The governance of the faqih is a subject that in itself elicits immediate assent and has little need of demonstration, for anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam will unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance of the faqih as soon as he encounters it; he will recognize it as necessary and self-evident.

Khomeini begins the Islamic Government by defining his theory as a self-evident concept that is clearly necessary. But, in what continues, his discussion turns to the religious law and what he describes as the goal of the Qur’ān and hadith. While he writes that Islamic law is a progressive, evolving, and comprehensive system, he enlightens his readers by pointing out that jurists have misunderstood the political or social principles of the Qur’ān and hadith:

In order to demonstrate to some extent, the difference between Islam and what is presented as Islam, I would like to draw your attention to the

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6 Arjomand, "The Shi’ite Hierocracy and the State in Pre-modern Iran: 1785-1890," 74.
difference between the Holy Qur’an and the books of hadith, on the one hand, and the practical treatises of jurisprudence, on the other. The Holy Qur’an and the books of hadith, which represent the sources for the commands and ordinances of Islam, are completely different from the treatises written by the mujtahids of the present age both in breadth of scope and in the effects, they are capable of exerting on the life of society. The ratio of Qur’anic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one. Of the approximately fifty sections of the corpus of hadith containing all the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship and the duties of man toward his Creator and Sustainer. A few more are concerned with questions of ethics, and all the rest are concerned with social, economic, legal, and political questions—in short, the gestation of society.  

Nevertheless, while Khomeinī’s discussion in *Islamic Government* is based on his views concerning Islamic law, the goal of this paper is to investigate the continuation of political philosophy and contemplation on Utopia in later Islamic philosophy, primarily through analyzing some of the works of the recent Iranian Shi`a philosopher and scholar of religion `Allāma Tabātabā’ī (1904-1981). The initial purpose of this chapter is to trace the Fārābīan heritage of political philosophy amongst the works of Tabātabā’ī that we will discuss in what follows.

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9 I need to briefly discuss another contemporary Shia philosopher, namely Mehdi Hā’irī Yazdī (1923–99) here. He was the son of Sheikh Abdul Karim Haeri Yazdi, the founder of the Qom Seminary. Hā’irī was also a disciple of Khomeini in philosophy and received his Ph.D. in Western philosophy from Toronto University. He discusses his political philosophy in his *Hekmat va Hukumat*. Apart from *Hekmat va Hokumat*, he penned ten other books, mainly about Islamic philosophy. Other than The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, Knowledge by Presence (1992), all his books, including *Hekmat va Hokumat*, are in Persian.
However, there is no agreement among contemporary scholars whether Tabātabā’ī was a political philosopher or whether he agreed or disagreed with Khomeini’s theory of Vilayat-i Faqīh. Some scholars claim that Khomeini’s theory of Vilayat-i Faqīh has roots in Mullā Ṣadrā ’s "Transcendent Philosophy" (al-Ḥikmah al-muta’āliyah) where he describes the four spiritual and intellectual journeys of the wayfarer toward the Divine. Considering the central role of al-Faqīh (jurist) in Khomeini’s theory as a ruler of Muslim society, it is hard to connect it to any particular philosophical school, particularly Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. None of the four qualities that Khomeini

In Hekmat va Hukumat, he mentions that state-society relations exclusively belong to ‘Aql ‘Amalī (practical intellect/reasoning) and is therefore completely out of the realm of metaphysics. As a result, these practical functions of governance do not belong to the metaphysical domain and hence do not require the expertise of religious scholars. It seems that Hā’irī in reaching this conclusion agrees with Tabātabā’ī (we will discuss Tabātabā’ī’s ideas later in this paper). Hā’irī, moreover, claims that Islamic political theory cannot be developed simply on the basis on jurisprudence. Instead, robust political thought must be strongly rooted in philosophy. Thereupon, when a conflict occurs in political affairs between practical philosophy (‘Aql ‘Amali), on the one hand, and Shi‘i jurisprudence on the other, one should side with practical philosophy. Hā’irī declined the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist, arguing that the government is inferior to the divine and to metaphysical reality contrary to the assertions of the theory of vilāyat-i faqīh.

Hā’irī challenges the idea that the rule of the Jurist, as Khomeini claims, is a continuation of the right to worldly rule bestowed upon the Prophet Mohammed and the Twelve Infallible Imams. He points out that even the Infallible Imams themselves were revealed to be the legitimate political leaders only after their Muslim communities had already expressed their desire for them to take charge: "This makes it very unlikely that the jurists have a divine right of leadership when even the Infallibles, who according to Shia theology have a special ontological status in the universe, did not themselves have the right to rule the Muslim community without the consensus of the governed" (Badamchi 2017, p.132). With the introduction of the notion of "joint private ownership" (Mālikīyyat-i Shakhsī Mushā`) in his book, Hā’irī is employing a concept derived from traditional Islamic jurisprudence as the basis of his theory of governance. Employing this Fiqhi theory makes us question whether Hā’irī is philosophizing about the governance or making another Fiqhi theory?
attributes to a ruler in the third chapter of his "Islamic Government"—such as intelligence (`ālim), administrative ability (Mudīr), expertise in Islamic law (Faqīh), and a clear moral record (`ādil)—are related to Sadrā's or al-Fārābī's philosophy. In our view, it instead is a theory based on his perception of Islamic Law and the role that he assigns to the jurist (Faqīh) in that law. Moreover, Khomeini mostly focuses on the superiority of faqih over philosophers. Javādī Āmulī, a contemporary Shi’a scholar, also interprets this theory as guardianship of Jurisprudence (Vilāyat-i Fiqh) and not the jurist (Faqīh).

Returning to our initial question, we will examine Tabātabā’ī’s works to investigate his political thoughts and philosophy concerning the Farabian tradition of political philosophy. It is evident that `Allāma wrote on governance in his various works, but it is still a valid question to ask whether he was discussing the rulership of a jurist or suggesting another system, and what are the foundations of his thought in explaining Islamic governance?

`Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī

`Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī ¹⁰ (1904-1981) is known for his prominent role in developing and reviving the tradition of Islamic philosophy and Qur’anic exegesis in the Qom seminary in the twentieth century. In his remarkable contribution, "The Principle of Philosophy and the Method of Realism" (Uṣūl-i Falsaf-i wa Rawishi Reālīsm), Ṭabāṭabā’ī discusses

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realities and concepts. “Vilāyat wa Zi`āmat” (Guardianship and Leadership) is an independent paper where he develops some of his ideas on governance. Al-mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān is his commentary on the Qur’ān and also includes a discussion on governance. In all of Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s works, the study of governance is categorized within the concept of al-a`tibā’iyāt al-`aqliya (Secondary Intellectual Considerations).

Before we begin discussing Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s thoughts on governance, we need to consider his principal philosophical theory, which affects his other discussions. Ṭabāṭabā’ī conceptualizes things into two categories of the “real” and “the secondary aspect.” In explaining this notion, he adds that:

Existents (mawjudāt - things that exist) from one aspect can be divided into two kinds. Any meaning which we intellectualize has either a correspondent in the external world existing in itself, such as external substances like minerals, plants, animals and so on, whether there is an agent of intellection (`āqil) or not. The correspondent exists only in terms of how we intellectualize it, and does not exist without this process, such as ownership. Concerning the matter of ownership, one does not find anything in the external world called 'ownership' beyond the actual substance of the thing owned, such as land, and the substance of the 'owner', which is the human being, and it is this relationship that is called 'ownership'. Therefore, the meaning of ownership is rooted in the process of intellection and thus, had the process of intellection not existed, the concept of ownership', 'owner' and 'the owned' would not have existed and there would have only been a man and a piece of land. The first kind of existent is called 'real' (haqiqi) and the second kind is called a 'mental construct' (itibari). We have proven in our book al-l’itibarat that every mental construct is subsistent (mutaqawwim) of a reality behind it. If we were to investigate and contemplate, we would find that all the notions determined by human beings and the relationships that exist between these very notions, like ownership and other specialties, leadership, relationships and issues related to them, etc., are all mental constructs and imaginary ideas which, through their subjective import, compel men to consider them as his primary requirements for social life and civilization to secure what is good and beneficial, and to ward off evil and harm.\(^{11}\)

Considering what Ṭabāṭabā’ī suggests in the distinction between things and concepts, it is necessary to ask where he places governance in this categorization. Is it “real” or

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\(^{11}\) Muḥammad Husayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Vicegerency = Risālah al-wilāyah (Qom: Islamic International Foundation of Cooperation, 2009), 1.
considered a “secondary intellectual consideration”? To find the answer to this question, one needs to assess Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s “Uṣūl-i Falsaf-i va Ravish-i Reaālism” (Principles of Philosophy and Methods of Realism) and his other philosophical works in which he clearly explains that leadership is a concept that is created based on the relations that a human society makes and it is, in fact, derived from other sorts of human relationships; it depends on social convention rather than rational evidence. In chapter eleven of his treatise "Mental Aspects or Secondary Concepts" (al-‘I’tibāriyāt), Tabātabā’ī discusses the concepts of leadership, subordination, and their demands. Leadership, therefore, is a mental construct that people create based on their needs. A mental construct is not a (metaphysically) real thing but secondary to (metaphysically) real things. Another question arises here that if leadership is a secondary and derivative concept, what is its importance in Tabātabā’ī’s thoughts? Thus, when leadership, because of being derivative and relative, is categorized as “Secondary Concepts" (al-‘I’tibāriyāt), one can not specify a single form of it.

Nevertheless, where the question of governance is concerned, it appears that Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s long chapter entitled “Vilāyat va Zi‘āmat” (“Guardianship and Leadership”) which is published within a collection of articles by scholars of religion and entitled Bahthī Darbaāriyi Marja’īyyat va Ruhānityat, was his first direct contribution to the discussion of religious leadership in Shia Islam. The collection was published in the memoir of grand Ayatullah Burūjerdī (1875 –1961), whose death caused a grave vacancy in the Shi‘ites’ religious leadership and Marja’īyya.

Remarkably, Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s contribution was the only chapter in the book devoted to the topic of the Islamic government. Tabataba’ī’s approach to the topic in the first place is philosophical. This chapter makes clear that Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s
argumentation and methodology differ from that of Fiqh (Jurisprudence) and Fuqahā’. He points out that his argument is formed from the point of view of Islamic social philosophy.

He argues for the necessity of governance as rooted in the essential disposition (fiṭra) of man as confirmed by revelation. He takes the following Qur’ānic verse as evidence:

> Be devoted to the upright religion. It is harmonious with the nature which God has designed for people. The design of God cannot be altered. Thus is the upright religion, but many people do not know. (Quran, 30:30)

Based on this view, the relationship between revelation and guardianship is conformational. That is why, according to Ṭabāṭabā’ī, no one questioned the necessity of having a leader after the death of Muhammad. In this chapter, Ṭabāṭabā’ī refers to the role of the leader with the Arabic terms Walī and Walī al-Amr (the head of the community). The leader’s role is to put into practice the necessary and permanent rules of the religion and manage the changeable and variable law based on the time and place requirements. Having divided the religious laws into permanent and variable, Ṭabāṭabā’ī points out the similarities between Islamic societies and democratic societies in which the constitution is permanent and unchangeable. At the same time, some laws are subject to change. He later mentions that this similarity is also a sign of difference because of the difference between the divine and human sources of the laws in both societies.¹² (Vilāyat va Zī‘amat, p. 85-6) While the will of

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¹² At least in the American case the founders considered themselves to be articulating God-given (and thus universal) rights. And thus, justifies the exporting of American democracy as a universal good. Some historians however, mention that the US Constitution was negotiated and debated, therefore it is not God-given (and thus universal).
the majority is the basis of change in a democratic society, Ṭabāṭabāʾī writes that “however, changeable laws in Islamic society are the result of the council of people, but their [the changes’] principal foundation is truth (Haqq), not the will of the majority.”

As mentioned, he first claims that guardianship is an inherent (Fiṭrī) trait before bringing forward the question of who should lead the community. His answer to this question, as Algar indicates, is quite ambiguous. Ṭabāṭabāʾī first claims that this is a matter beyond the concern of the chapter, as evidenced in the following lines: “these are matters which lie beyond our current concern and must be solved in the context of fiqh” (Vilāyat va Zi`āmat) Nevertheless, he still provides some characteristics of the leader:

“The individual who excels all others in piety, administrative ability (husn-i tadbīr), and awareness of contemporary circumstances, is best fitted for this position [the leadership of society].” (Vilāyat va Zi`āmat)

Algar suggests that this sentence “is an endorsement of the thesis of vilayat-i faqih (‘governance of the faqih’) as propagated by Imam Khomeini, and bears indeed some similarity to Article 109 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which spells out the qualifications required in the leader (rahbar).”

Despite what Algar suggests, Ṭabāṭabāʾī raises an exciting question in conclusion as to whether Vilayat belongs to all of the Muslims or only to Faqih as it is understood.

13 ibid


15 ibid
today. It is essential to point out that according to Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Mulla Sadra, and some other scholars, the modern notion of Faqīh has a narrower interpretation than the original sense that included all intellectual and transmitted knowledge, and not merely transmitted knowledge.¹⁶

Now, returning to Algar’s claim, I argue that, on the contrary, Tabataba’i’s and Ayatullāh Khomeini’s theory of Vilāyat are not similar, much less identical, first and foremost because of a very broad definition of Faqīh by Ṭabāṭabāʾī and, secondly, because of the philosophical nature of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s discussion in comparison to Khomeini’s Fiqhī definitions of Vilāyat al-Faqīh. On the other hand, in response to the question of whether one leader (Walī), must rule over all Muslim societies or not, Ṭabāṭabāʾī indicates that “this is one of the issues that Islam has not discussed, and in fact, it should not do so. Because religion includes permanent matters (dhātī), while the method of governing is subject to change based on the change and transition of

¹⁶ Sadrā, in his "Breaking the Idols of Ignorant," describes the original meaning of al-Fiqh as follows: In the earlier time, in the age of the Prophet and the purified Imams, peace be upon all of them, jurisprudence (al-fiqh) was totally limited to the knowledge of the First Real, and the knowledge of the path of the Hereafter and the blights of the soul and the states of the heart, and the way of refining the temper, and changing the evil deeds into good ones. It was not the knowledge of contracts for delivery with prepayment, mortgages, financial interests, divorce, repudiation within marriage, division of inheritance of the dead, learning jurisprudential loopholes, the way of escaping from legal pursuits, and the way of keeping some of the illegal issues. Sometimes man's life ends without ever needing any of them. These issues are necessary to the limit that there should be in every age some people that adopt them in their responsibility, whereas jurisprudence [Fiqh] in the former meaning is an individual's duty or an indubitable obligation for every wise person. (Shirazi, Mulla Sadra, BREAKING THE IDOLS OF IGNORANCE: ADMONITION OF THE SOI-DISTANT SUIF / SADR AL-DIN SHIRAZI (MULLA SADRA), trans. M.Dasht Borzorgi & F. Asadi Amjad. Edited & Introduced by S.K Toussi. (London, ICAS, 2008),
societies in accordance with the development of civilizations.” Nevertheless, he mentions that three things—unity and integrity, protecting the interest of the Muslims, and replacing the geographical borders with the borders of belief and faith—are what define Islamic permanent rules in government. He finally emphasizes that consultation is the foundation of the orders issued by Valī. These positions differentiate Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s theory of leadership from that of Khomeini.

In his commentary on the Quran, Al-Mizân fi al-Tafsîr al-Qur’ân, Ṭabāṭabāʾī, emphasizes that the responsibility of believers in establishing and sustaining their society is an essential element of Islamic social philosophy. “The executive power in Islam is not confined within a separate class; implementation of Islamic laws is the responsibility of all members of the society. Each and every individual is obligated to call to the good, to enjoin what is good and forbid the evil. He lines up verses in which God’s commands address all believers and make them responsible for those duties.

17 Muhammad Husain Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Baḥthi dar bāriyi marjaʿīyyat wa rūḥaniyyat ([Tihrān]: Shirkat-i Sīhāmī-i Intishār, 1980), 98.
18 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Baḥthi dar bāriyi marjaʿīyyat wa rūḥaniyyat, 98.
19 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Baḥthi dar bāriyi marjaʿīyyat wa rūḥaniyyat, 99.
20 Muhammad Husain Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Al-Mizan : An Exegesis of the Quran vol. 7 (Tehran: WOFIS, 1990), 107-45. See his commentary on Qur’an 3. 200
21 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Al-Mizan : An Exegesis of the Quran 7, 136.
22 Following are the verses in discussion: ... and establish prayers ... [4:77]; ... and strive hard in His way ... [5:35]; ... and give upright testimony for Allāh ... [65:2];... fasting has been prescribed for you ... [2:183]; And spend in the way of Allāh ... [2:195]; And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong [3:104]; And strive hard in (the way of) Allāh a striving as is due to Him ... [22:78]; (As for) the fornicatress and the fornicator, flog each of them, (giving) a hundred stripes ... [24:2]; And (as for) the man who steals and the woman who steals, cut off their hands ... [5:38];And there is
then clarifies his thoughts about public responsibility in his discussion of governance in conclusion:

There are many verses of this nature, and all taken together make it clear that religion is a collective matter which Allāh has made people responsible for; He is not pleased with disbelief for His servants; and He intends only that all of them together should establish the religion. The society of which they are members should be managed by themselves — none of them should be less responsible than the others. Enforcement of law is not an especial prerogative of some to the exclusion of others — be he the Prophet or the others.  

In this sense, Ṭabāṭabāʾī points to verses in the Qur’ān that order all people to prevent social crimes, and he concludes that governance is the responsibility of all people. He additionally states that when people are involved in political issues, they are already engaged in their own business and duties. Therefore, they should not be banned from performing their own business.  

When Ṭabāṭabāʾī mentions the prophet’s leadership in the early Muslim community, he repeats that this leadership is different from both monarchic rule and democracy. The only goal of such rulership involves truth (Haqq), which is replaced by the ruler's will in the case of a monarchy. However, in a democracy, the truth may be replaced by the majority’s will and is thus against Haqq. So far as the occultation era is concerned, Ṭabāṭabāʾī states that “the authority of the Islamic government lies in the hands of the Muslims themselves.” and if they are supposed to appoint a ruler for life for you in (the law of) retaliation ... [2:179]; And hold fast by the cord of Allāh all together and be not divided ... [3:103].  

Ṭabāṭabāʾī further applies another Qur’ānic command, “maintain with justice,” to show more example of public responsibility in Islamic governance.
Islamic society, they must follow the tradition of Imamah, not of monarchy and Imperialism” (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1986, p. 179)

This statement provides evidence for Algar’s claim in which he criticizes Nasr for claiming that Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s traditional philosophical thought is not evident in politics.25 Although this may be true to some extent, there is nonetheless evidence from Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s life and practice that illustrate that his idea of Islamic government did not accord with that which formed after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979. Kadivar’s paper, entitled “Dar in Inqilāb Yek Shahīd vāqi’ī bud, ki maẓlūmāni ham shahīd shod, va Ān Islam būd”, documents Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s brazen statement after the revolution: “there was only one true martyr in this revolution, and it was Islam.” 26 Also, so far as guardianship is concerned, Ṭabāṭabā’ī indicates that “he has to manage the affairs with consultations according to the time and situation.” 27

Moreover, based on his commentary on Qur’an 4:88, Ṭabāṭabā’ī shows his disagreement with those who define scholars of Fiqh (Fuqahā) as “those who have been entrusted with authority” (Uli al-Amr). We have already mentioned Mullā Ṣadrā’s

25 Algar, in a footnote to his article on Ṭabāṭabā’ī mentions that “S. H. Nasr has sought repeatedly to insinuate, however, that a basic discrepancy exists between ‘the traditional Islamic perspective’ represented by ‘Allama Ṭabāṭabā’ī’and the fundamental tendencies of the Islamic Revolution.” (Algar, 2006, p.348)


27 Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Al-Mizan : An Exegesis of the Quran 7, 134.
and Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s definition of al-Fiqh in its early Islamic sense. Now, with consideration of the modern and narrow meaning of jurisprudence (Fiqh/ Islamic Law), Ṭabāṭabā’ī rejects the idea that mere expertise in Fiqh qualifies an individual for the leadership position or makes him an expert on socio-political issues. In fact, as much as he stresses the importance of the leader’s characteristics such as piety, administrative ability (husn-i tadbir), and awareness of contemporary circumstances, he does not emphasize the leader’s knowledge of Fiqh.

Conclusion

Al-Fārabi (872-950) was the first known Muslim philosopher to philosophize about the ideal society or Utopia. The initial question of this paper was an inquiry about the fate of political philosophy among the Muslim philosophers, and in particular, contemporary Shia philosophers. The general assumption about the relationship between Shi’ite Islam and governance in both contemporary and the post-occultation milieu is marked by Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of the Wilāyat al-Faqīh (The Guardianship of the Jurist) which is, according to what we discussed in this paper, an approach based on the science of Fiqh in its narrow, modern understanding.

`Allama Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s discussion of governance and guardianship has a philosophical foundation. He categorizes governance in what he calls i’tibāriyāt al-`aqliya (Intellectual Considerations/Derivative Existences). Such categorization could result in flexible forms of governance. In his various works, Ṭabāṭabā’ī also discusses the issue of Vilayat or guardianship; nevertheless, the overall result of his speculation is not

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identical with Ayatullah Khomeini’s theory of guardianship of the jurist. On the contrary, he questions and rejects the idea that mere expertise in Fiqh qualifies an individual for a leadership position or makes him an expert on socio-political issues. His views on governance can be summarized by referring to the terms and notions he applies to his works. These include ideas such as Istikhdām (a leader is appointed by the people), justice and good for all, the authority of all to all (Taslīt Kulli `Alā al-Kull), and public Vilayah, all of which are based on his Shia beliefs.

By comparing Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s political philosophy with al-Fārābī’s concept of a philosopher-king, it is clear that Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s political philosophy is influenced by both the Shia idea of Imamah on the one hand and his mystical-philosophical way of life on the other. It, in fact, is a return to social philosophy in the tradition of Islamic philosophy with all characteristic that Ṭabāṭabāʾī creates for it.

Perhaps the most telling evidence for the disagreement between Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Khomeini’s concept of guardianship is the fact that, after the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophical and religious thought was widely discussed in Iran. Yet, his disciples completely neglected his political philosophy and governance theory.


