The Cruelty of Banality

Joshua Ayer¹

¹University of Alberta

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Abstract

This paper provides a novel exploration of extreme global poverty using an original framework that combines critiques of cruelty with the concept of necro-economics. Departing from conventional perspectives on inequality and poverty that accept both as necessary, I contend that global inequality is inherently cruel in outcome and in the becoming cruel of necro-economic subjects.

Necro-economics, conceptualized by Warren Montag, is an underutilized concept within the broader biopolitical discourse. Like necro-politics, necro-economics emphasizes the centrality of death within modern economic apparatuses. I show how the concept can be usefully applied to understanding the global economy. The study re-evaluates two perspectives on global poverty (human rights and structural violence) and suggests that both are inadequate for explaining the role of cruelty within the system.

To address this gap, I turn to the work of Zygmunt Bauman to show how the global economy, as a necro-economic system engenders a process of cruel subjectivation. The necro-economic framework developed within this paper reveals the global economic system to be one that requires suffering from those at the margins while simultaneously cultivating a callous indifference amongst those at the center. This occurs through self-reinforcing processes of distancing and substituting technical for moral responsibility. In conclusion, the paper establishes that the global economic structure perpetuates suffering through the becoming cruel of necro-economic subjects, shedding new light on the intricate relationship between capitalism, inequality, and human suffering.
Introduction

According to a recent Oxfam report, 21,000 people (or one person every four seconds) die from poverty-related causes. Extreme poverty is a particularly distressing phenomenon because, in addition to its slow and effective eradication of human life, it is also predictable and preventable. It is predictable both in the sense that the consequences of extreme poverty are well known and that it claims victims regularly and consistently. Meanwhile, it is preventable because poverty is an outcome of dysfunctional policies that, with reform, could keep millions from starvation and/or suffering from treatable diseases.

Inequality (whose most severe consequence is poverty), which translates into greater relative vulnerability in an increasingly volatile world, has risen exponentially since the global pandemic. Though rejected on principle, global inequality is typically accepted as the best outcome of the only feasible economic system. This pessimistic view contrasts with the optimistic one that imagines inequality to be temporary. Both views see inequality as anomalous (or external) to the productivity of capitalism, which differs from the Marxist critique of inequality as an intrinsic consequence of capitalism. All three, however, view inequality as dysfunctional, whether because the system itself is dysfunctional (Marxists), or as an outlying consequence for the system to remediate. In contrast, I contend that global inequality is not dysfunctional, but cruel.

Discourses on cruelty often depend on a particular subject who is cruel or acts cruelly towards a victim in a way that causes physical, psychological, or emotional suffering. People normally understand cruel behaviour to be intentional, though it might not be in all circumstances (as critics and activists argue regarding non-human or animal cruelty), and it might also take the form of inaction (cruel indifference). What remains essential is that one subject causes another’s
suffering. This notion of cruelty becomes problematic when applied to the capitalist global economy. Here, the global economy refers to the interconnected systems of production and consumption that span the globe and the myriad of institutions, policies and trade agreements that condition the possibilities of those systems. The system is capitalist in that states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) use markets to allocate goods, services, and profits, while the capitalist class re-invests the surplus from global production to further increase productive capacities. A hallmark of globalization is the dispersion of production and consumption across globalized networks to such an extent that one’s life becomes inundated with commodities marked by intercontinental travel and exploitation. Consequently, those in affluent countries are implicated in, and enjoy the benefits of, relations that perpetuate exploitation and poverty. At the same time, though it is true that the global economy mediates the blatant cruelty of a few actors, this phenomenon does not represent any challenge to the general notion of cruelty. The more significant challenge is to reconcile the scale of suffering perpetuated by the global economy with the general innocence (if not naïve benevolence) of many of the perpetrators. My solution to this challenge is to locate cruelty in the unique quality of the global economic system itself as a system that abrogates moral responsibility between self and others, rather than in the subjects themselves who might otherwise choose not to inflict suffering.

Perhaps, rather than saying that the global economy is ‘cruel’ it would be more sensible to say that there is a degree of cruelty in the indifference shown by affluent societies regarding the consequences of their actions in the global economy. However, one cannot separate this cruel indifference from the working of the global economy itself, whose technocratic nature renders those it benefits cruelly indifferent. Below, I discuss the concept of necro-economics developed by Warren Montag which provides a useful frame for problematizing the inherent ‘letting die’ in
capitalism. While affirming Montag’s reading of the necro-economic logic at work in Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, I push the concept further by recentring cruelty. In the subsequent section, I re-interpret two perspectives on global poverty within a necro-economic framework. The first perspective argues that global poverty constitutes a human rights violation tantamount to a crime against humanity; the second perspective argues that global poverty is the consequence of the structural violence inherent to the global capitalist system. Both perspectives substantiate the necro-economic claim that the ‘letting die’ of particular groups is a functional necessity of global capitalism, however, neither sufficiently account for the continuing legitimacy of the system, a problem shared with those theorizing in necro-economics. I resolve this gap with a reading of Zygmunt Bauman’s *Modernity and the Holocaust* to theorize the processes that lead to the cruel subjectivization inculcated by a necro-economic system. The analysis, in concluding, demonstrates that necro-economics sufficiently reveals the centrality of death in the functioning of the global economic system and furthermore that this system is cruel in that it necessitates and inculcates cruel indifference from its economic subjects.

I. Necro-economics

The concept of necro-economics places negation, rather than production, at the core of modern economics. Though it is common to construe the economy as a sphere of generation (even when exploitation is central to the analysis), necro-economics inverts this expectation by showing that the ‘life’ produced by capitalist economies, the benefits of which are enjoyed by a disproportionate few, necessitates that others die. Warren Montag develops the term through a Hegelian reading of Adam Smith in a paper entitled “Necro-economics: Adam Smith and death in the life of the universal.” According to Montag, Smith inspires Hegel’s concept of a ‘universal’ that emerges from the (initially) unintentional actions of individuals (Hegel only refers to Smith explicitly in
Philosophy of Right rather than the Phenomenology of Spirit). Both Smith and Hegel argue that the contingent work of individuals constitutes the life which sustains the universal human community. Montag writes in summary of Hegel, that “in the universal, there is life, in the particular only death,” which is an idea that Montag suggests is unmistakably Smithian. Montag continues though, revealing that Smith pushes the function of the negative (death) further than Hegel in grounding a life-sustaining universal on a regulated ‘letting die.’

Though the bulk of the paper analyzes the necro-economic logic of Smith’s political economics, the broader consequences for Montag are a re-reading of the present through the Hegelian reading of Smith. Smith can reveal certain structural features of our present because the prevailing economic structure—capitalism—remains, at its core, the system of economic production that Smith anticipated. Montag writes, “if the last forty years have shown us anything it is that we have read and are still reading Smith, that he is read for us and to us far more than was ever the case with Marx and that his words shape our dreams and destinies especially when we cite them without knowing it, taking his words as our own.” Reading Smith can help one read the present, because the present is shaped and influenced by the vision of political economics he first elaborated. There are thus two movements that are immanent to Montag’s analysis: first, showing that for Smith the universal (the market) that sustains human life requires that certain groups regularly be ‘let die’ in unglamorous deprivation; and second, showing how this ideal economic type continues to exert influence on present necro-economies. Crucially, the ‘economy’ more broadly might not be intrinsically governed by the necessity of ‘letting die,’ but Montag shows persuasively that such a logic is operative in Smith’s economic theories and remains operative today.
Bio and Necro power:

The term necro-economics sits within the Foucauldian lineage of biopower, beginning with Michel Foucault’s emphasis on apparatuses that capture, mould, and generate life and continuing down through the more recent elaborations of the concept by philosophers Giorgio Agamben and Achille Mbembe. By situating necro-economics in the biopolitical genealogy, Montag is thus extending his analysis to present configurations of power as a potential necro-technology. Where Foucault maintained the distinction between sovereign power as ‘the right to take life or let live’ and biopower as the power ‘to make live or let die,’ Mbembe, following Agamben’s exploration of biopolitics in *Homo Sacer,* re-asserts death’s immanence to mechanisms of life indicating that behind every ‘make live’ is a ‘let die.’ The figures that bear the necro-political violence in Mbembe’s and Agamben’s accounts are ‘sacred’ (‘sacer’) in that the socio-political order includes them only through their exclusion (since homo sacer’s status as outside the social order is necessary to sustain that same order). Necro-politics, accordingly, refers to the formation of such zones that are included through their exclusion as sites of political violence. For Agamben, the prime example of these zones of exception are the prisoners of war camps, particularly those of Nazi Germany; for Mbembe, it is the colony and the colonized. In turning to a necro-economics (that compliments its political equivalent), Montag adds “another figure” to Agamben’s prisoner of war, and Mbembe’s colonized, “one whose death is no doubt less spectacular than the first and is the object of no memorial or commemoration; he who with impunity may be allowed to die, slowly or quickly, in the name of the rationality and equilibrium of the market.” To the elaborate killings envisioned by Agamben and Mbembe, Montag adds the slow death of necessary deprivation.
Turning to Smith, Montag shows how death figures centrally in two senses between the Wealth of Nations and a Theory of Moral Sentiments. First, death (or the threat of) is a necessary foundation of human society for reigning in irrational (self-destructive) self-interest. Only the fear of retribution (death and punishment) can restrain defective individual self-interest. This is the most basic (if not most Hobbesian) level at which the life of a people requires death as a regulator. This death, according to Smith, is necessary for “the oeconomy of nature”—the natural order of things. Here Montag notes, Smith is indicating that “if societies…must exercise, and not merely possess, the right to kill, the market, understood as the very human universality as life, must necessarily, at certain precise moments ‘let die’.” The necro-economy is therefore a mode of economics that takes for granted a moderated amount of death in its calculations. This, though perhaps disconcerting, is not cruel in and of itself. What is cruel about the necro-economy is not the economy as such but the economy as a mode of relation between subjects that demands indifference to the suffering one inflicts upon unknown others for the system to function smoothly.

To that extent, cruelty, specifically cruel indifference, is necessary in Smith’s economy. For example, Smith demands that merchants behave cruelly to their fellow human beings when raising prices and lowering wages to their most profitable point without concern for their welfare. First, Smith observes a natural tension in society between masters and workers wherein the masters will seek to give as little (in wages) and the workers to take as much as possible. Though this should result in an equilibrium, Smith acknowledges that the advantage clearly lies with the master who can ‘out-provision’ the worker, typically years at a time, and force the worker to accept a lower wage. However, a starved or dead worker is of no practical use to a master, therefore, the subsistence wage acts as a natural minimum to which the wage can be lowered. This arrangement holds until crises, such as famine, lower the fund for wages. Smith, though, is adamant that shocks,
like famine, will be remedied by the market. It is nevertheless consistent with Smith’s logic, writes Montag that “the subsistence of a population may, and does in specific circumstances, require the death of a significant number of individuals: to be precise it requires that they be allowed to die so that others may live.” Montag insists that one take Smith seriously and carefully on this point. Smith does not believe that markets will avoid famine, he believes markets will mediate famine most effectively, i.e., better than human benevolence could. The market is merely a more “rational mechanism for managing death than any other available alternative.” When disaster strikes, its consequences will be best meted out by the market.

It does not matter whether Smith is theoretically correct or incorrect regarding the effective market distribution of dearth and death. What matters more is the cruel indifference that Smith recommends to merchants in facing the “desperate men” who “act with folly and extravagance” in light of their starvation. Smith cheers on the market’s happy providence that guides merchants to seek the highest price for their commodities (e.g., corn), something they do entirely out of self-interest that produces the collective good: rationing the amount of food available to the poor. The only role for governments in such circumstances is to defend the merchant to allow them to best synchronize their actions with the market. By protecting “the hungry from their own improvident and irrational impulses,” the merchant’s self-interest more effectively regulates the crisis than altruism. At this point, one might wonder, if prices rise as wages go down, what prevents the market from placing commodities entirely out of reach of the poor? Smith’s answer is that where the funds for the labouring poor are decreasing, the market will reduce the “number of inhabitants to what can be easily maintained by the revenue stock which remained in it” largely through “the instruments” of want and famine. Montag summarizes: “death establishes the conditions of life; death as by an invisible hand restores the market to what it must be to support life.”
(death) maintains the production of life (equilibrium). The ideal order that Smith describes not only necessitates the death of specific populations but requires indifference from those who might otherwise be tempted to intervene out of sympathy for their fellow human—economic rationality demands this basic cruelty. In contrast to homo sacer who may be killed without consequence, homo economicus is they who let die with indifference.

**Necro-economics and scarcity:**

In their book *Savage Economics*, Blaney and Inayatullah argue that the necro-economics of capitalism that thinkers, following Smith, argue are necessary and inevitable are in fact neither. Capitalism itself only appears inevitable and its costs necessary because it presents itself discursively to have temporally superseded all other modes of economy. Blaney and Inayatullah describe this as capitalism’s wall. They argue that capitalism creates its own space and time that simultaneously incorporates all alternative economies while dislocating them from their own space-time and subordinating them under its own as ‘pre’ capital forms of social organization. This dislocation of space and time creates a seemingly impenetrable wall around capitalism that renders it singular and inevitable as a system of economy since it succeeds all others by perfecting them or destroying them. In the end, Capitalism locates poverty and dearth as pre-capitalism and capitalism as the inauguration of unlimited wealth creation.

Capitalism’s spatio-temporal dislocations conceal the fact that capitalism emerges from particular geographic spaces in particular times. Economists and critics of economics tend to share the belief that the economy is acultural, meaning that even if the economy does not designate a separate sphere, it alludes to one and imposes a techno-rationalistic perspective onto reality. Blaney and Inayatullah, on the other hand argue that political economy is a cultural project. Those who critique the economy as a separate alienating sphere miss that “the imperial imposition of
economic rationality is motivated and vivified by broader social goals, namely an expansion of
wealth” as “a precondition for freedom and individuality.” Economic rationality is inseparable
from broader cultural meanings and values. Orthodox economists ignore this because they are
committed to the net benefits of capitalism, cultural critics ignore it because they refuse to debate
the virtues of capitalism.

Underlying the necro-economic logic of western political-economic thought is ultimately
the threat of scarcity. Scarcity is and is not ontological. The matter depends on the relative scale
of production and effectiveness of distribution (i.e., the economy). Entropy, for instance, might
limit the available energy in the universe, but this does not immediately signify net energy scarcity
relative to the needs of a single planet. Blaney and Inayatullah provide the following example. If
someone asks you to do something for them and you respond, ‘sorry, I don’t have the time’ this is
only partially true. The truth is that the time is available in one sense, but not worth sacrificing
priorities x, y, and z in your personal allotment of time. “Shifting from the individual to the global,”
write Blaney and Inayatullah,

if x, y, and z happen to represent massive alienation, immiseration, and angry despondency by the
vast majority of the planet’s population, I am saying that I have other things that need my attention.
Indeed, I imply that such immiseration is an acceptable cost given how the system of wealth
creation we call capitalism benefits me/us.

Resources are not inherently ontologically scarce, and mass immiseration is not necessary. It
appears as such according to the current arrangement of things. Capitalism creates enormous
wealth and poverty which Blaney and Inayatullah refer to as capitalism’s “wound.” When one
portrays capitalism as inevitable, one can more easily ignore that capitalism benefits some while
fatally costing others. Situated between those who argue capitalism has ‘saturated all social
relations’ and those who argue for the independency of the market, Blaney and Inayatullah remind their audience that capitalism is an economic system that serves western-European cultural values. Economies are not loose-floating, dis-embedded apparatuses, but emerge out of specific historical and geographical contexts.

The global economy, moreover, is not inherently a mechanism for regulating death but becomes so when mediated by a culture that represses and ignores capitalism’s wounds behind a spatio-temporal wall of necessity. Such a wall demands indifference to the suffering inflicted by one’s actions. I will return to the subjectivity of necro-economics in the third section. The following section meanwhile presents two perspectives on the global economy that stage a confrontation between seemingly banal actions and their consequences, bringing the global economic system’s necro-economics to the fore. I will then return to the necro-subjectivity of homo economicus.

II. necro-economics and global poverty

The following two perspectives bring the concealed necro-economics of global capitalism to the foreground. The first perspective, based largely on Thomas Pogge’s critique of the international system, argues that global poverty amounts to a violation of human rights and a crime against humanity. The second argues that global poverty is a consequence of structural violence, thereby locating the production of poverty within capitalism’s intrinsic negation of life. The former view is closer to a necro-political imaginary that presents the economy as a sphere amenable to benevolent reform. Here, though the economy mediates global poverty, specific institutions, policies, and state actors bear the responsibility. The structural view, on the other hand, is more consistent with the critique of necro-economics. However, both demonstrate the way in which ‘letting die’ is central to the global economy.
Poverty as Human Rights Violation:

Thomas Pogge is a German philosopher who has long suggested that the state of global poverty constitutes a human rights violation tantamount to a crime against humanity. Though this second point has been made more implicitly than the first, Gwilym Blunt has traced the contours of both and demonstrated their logic to be cogent. Importantly, Pogge differentiates between institutional and interactional human rights. The difference between the two is that interactional rights concern one’s direct obligation to a fellow human, whereas institutional rights concern one’s obligation to support or withhold support of institutions that affirm or violate human rights. Institutional rights are structural and consist of latent duties that are only active within relevant contexts (for instance, the global economy). The advantages of Pogge’s dualistic approach to rights are that it advances the language of human rights beyond the strictures of legal codification; it recognizes violations that occur even where they occur under the colour of law (official disrespect); and it encompasses negative obligations like the duty to withhold support for such systems. All these are instrumental in analyzing global poverty as a human rights violation.

According to Pogge’s concept of institutional rights, if freedom from poverty is a human right, then an interactional conception of human rights obligates one to withhold support for systems that engender poverty. There are two key grounds that Blunt identifies for recognizing poverty as a violation of human rights. The first argues that the prevalence of poverty flatly contradicts any form of global cosmopolitanism grounded in a conception of human flourishing. More to the point, though, the human rights framework already recognizes freedom from poverty within its framework. Per article 25(1) of the Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (1948).  

Since global poverty is destructive to human flourishing and freedom from poverty is affirmed by the declaration of human rights, Blunt concludes that citizens of affluent countries have a negative obligation to withhold support for systems that perpetuate poverty, if not the far more demanding positive obligation to dismantle those systems.  

*Poverty as a Crime Against Humanity:*  
The matter of whether global poverty constitutes a crime against humanity in addition to a violation of human rights depends largely upon the definition of ‘attack’ per the Rome Statute’s definition where Crimes Against Humanity are defined as acts that are “committed as part of [A] a widespread or systemic attack directed against any civilian population, [B] with knowledge of the attack.” The nature of global poverty as an attack is as ambiguous as the violence of the outcome is irrefutable. After surveying the field of literature on actions constituting ‘attacks’ in the context of crimes against humanity, Blunt concludes that an attack does not necessarily imply conditions of war or armed conflict.  

Thus, global poverty can fulfil the criteria of an attack pursuant to the definition of a crime against humanity inflicted by affluent states upon vulnerable populations perpetrated through international systems including the global economy. Regarding the rest of the statute’s definition, Blunt argues that global poverty is not an isolated incident, but the result of widespread and systemic policy pursued by states and independent organizations [A]. Finally, global poverty also passes the knowledge threshold [B] since, as Pogge argues repeatedly, global poverty occurs despite it being foreseeable and preventable.  

Pogge argues that global poverty is the foreseeable and preventable consequence of the international state system and its policies. First, the international system of states “facilitate[s]
oppression and instability in weak states.” by entrenching authoritarian governments and trapping states in debts they are unlikely to pay off. Additionally, within the international system, affluent states can shape the global economy to fit their purposes. This is most evident in the protectionist subsidies and tariffs that these states impose on vulnerable states while simultaneously demanding weaker economic protections from those same states. Such an arrangement is particularly consequential regarding agricultural subsidies and intellectual patents related to life-saving medicines.

More to the point, however, Pogge argues that poverty-related deaths are preventable. For instance, meaningful change could begin with “fairer terms of economic cooperation within the existing framework” (loosening or eliminating protectionist barriers, absolving debts, cracking down on tax havens) but go as far as “fundamental adjustments to the international system” (a Global Resource Dividend that redistributes wealth through a tax on resource exploitation and a health impact fund for increasing access to vital medicines). These reforms range from potentially feasible to likely unfeasible, but this is irrelevant for Pogge’s argument. To refute the strong thesis that no other regime is possible, one only has to demonstrate the weaker thesis that at least some alternatives are feasible; in this case, fairer terms of trade and regulatory mechanisms. Namely, one must only prove that the current regime is not inevitable, or necessary.

The mass immiseration of human beings is not listed amongst the acts considered to be crimes against humanity by the Rome Statute. However, Blunt makes a compelling case that global poverty bears close resemblance to two crimes that the Rome Statute does recognize: apartheid and slavery. Blunt defines slavery as a system of domination where “X, an agent, possesses capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the choices available to Y, a dependent agent.” This relation may exist formally (legally) or informally. Following this definition, Blunt argues that
over 27 million people are enslaved, and international organizations largely perpetuate the conditions in which relationships of slavery are more likely to occur while citizens of affluent countries reap the benefits. With regards to apartheid, Blunt argues that the asymmetric distribution of power in the international system produces unfair terms of global economic cooperation, which produces circumstances of domination. Blunt writes that the global poor are “subjected to an international system that deeply affects their basic autonomy, but over which they have no control. This is comparable to apartheid.” The global system perpetuates systems of slavery and produces contemporary forms of slavery, such as sweatshops, while excluding the global poor from setting the terms of the system through which they are dominated. In sum, Blunt’s analysis glimpses the necro-economy of global capitalism by recognizing the enormous cost of life required to sustain the appearance of affluence in wealthy states. However, without recognizing how global capitalism structures and determines this relationship, Blunt’s analysis stops short of comprehending the global necro-economy in full.

**Structural Violence and Capitalism:**

Garry Leech, on the other hand, provides an analysis that is more consistent with a critique of necro-economics. In *Capitalism: a Structural Genocide*, Leech argues that the economic system of capital perpetuates a structural form of violence and that the death produced by this violence constitutes genocide. Structural violence is a term theorized by sociologist Johan Galtung to refer to the deprivation of people’s basic needs because of existing social structures. Paraphrasing Galtung, Leech writes that “social injustice and inequality, both in power and in wealth, lie at the core of structural violence when they result from social structures that disproportionately benefit one group of people while preventing others from meeting their fundamental needs. Therefore,
social structures that cause human suffering and death constitute structural violence.” Consistent with a necro-economics analysis, Leech argues that capitalism is inherently violent.

Leech maintains that there are legitimate arguments that global capitalism amounts to genocide. His argument however requires an explication of capitalism’s internal logic which “forces it to expand to every corner of the globe” in a search for greater profits resulting in “inequality and deprivation of basic needs for billions of people.” Capital can come in many forms (money, land, buildings, machinery, goods produced, etc.) and its purpose is self-expansion (accumulation) through the generation of profits and rents. In a capitalist economy, those who own capital use it to generate more capital by producing commodities that have ‘use-values’ and selling them on the market (their ‘exchange-value) and producing a surplus. The profits generated feed an accumulation of capital where capitalists re-invest the surplus into the production of more commodities and the generation of more profits. Capitalism continuously expands by integrating increasingly more phenomena into its circuits of production to generate profits. To recognize that the global economy is primarily capitalist in nature is to recognize both that the international political economy follows market-based systems of private ownership, free markets, and free enterprise, and that it is organized according to the needs of accumulation and profit maximization (i.e., economic growth). Leech follows Pogge and many other scholars (including but not exclusively Marxists) in observing that the global system of capital is highly favourable to a disproportionate few resulting in mass immiseration on the one end of global inequality and mass accumulation of wealth on the other. As non-capitalist states have been gradually forced to open their territories to free markets, a similar pattern of wealth concentration at the core and mass immiseration at the periphery (often along the north-south vertical axis) has repeated across the world. In sum, every day, hundreds of millions of people throughout the global South struggle to
meet their fundamental needs, while a small minority accumulate enormous wealth. These social injustices and inequality are inherent components of capitalism; as such they constitute structural violence.

*Structural Genocide:* 

Though many might accept the argument that structural violence is inherent to capitalism, others might be hesitant to accept that such violence constitutes genocide. Understandably then, Leech’s discussion of the topic carefully follows discourses elaborating the definition provided by the United Nations Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Genocide is therein defined as acts:

- committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious, group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcible transferring children of the group to another group.  

In addition to the above definition, Leech also notes that the Rome Conference, which saw the establishment of the International Criminal Court, expanded the definition of Crimes Against Humanity “to include crimes perpetrated during times of peace in addition to those committed in war.” Crucially, neither excludes structural violence as a means.

Intentionality is inherently difficult to determine in matters of structural violence. Leech addresses the subject by differentiating between structural and individual intentionality, where the structural intentionality of capitalism is the predictable outcome of actions mediated by the structure:
the issue here is not so much the ‘intent’ of individuals, but rather the ‘intent’ of the structures of a social system. The ‘intentional’ outcomes of actions that adhere to a particular social system are directly determined by the logic of that system. Therefore, if adhering to the logic of a social system inevitably results in structural violence that causes death on a mass scale, then it is apparent that structural genocide is an intentional outcome of human behaviours that adhere to that logic.72

Regardless of whether individuals intend the inevitable outcomes of their actions, the fact that those outcomes are known and inevitable make the outcome intended. They are, after all, hardly accidental or unlikely. Since capitalism is a social structure that produces violence resulting in the loss of millions of lives, the global system perpetrates a form of structural genocide which Leech sums up as “violence that intentionally inflicts on any group or collectivity conditions of life that bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”73 The order that global capitalism establishes is therefore necro-economic since it requires an enormous ‘letting die’ to retain functionality.

Leech analyzes the degrees and vicissitudes of structural violence inherent to capitalism across four case studies. The first concerns farmers in Mexico who have suffered under the trade terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Though, in theory, NAFTA allows all member states to subsidize their agricultural industries, ancillary agreements with the US and International Monetary Fund (IMF) simultaneously prohibit Mexico from doing so. Such a condition allows the US to flood the Mexican market with subsidized corn and consequently devastate the lives of millions of Mexican farmers, forcing them into increasingly fragile and vulnerable states as they desperately search for the means of subsistence.74 Leech examines a similar situation in India where, between 1997 and 2009, 216,500 Indian farmers committed suicide – more than 16,600 a year – in despair over insurmountable debts.75 In 2021, news outlets
reported that 28 farmers commit suicide a day, or 10,220 a year.\textsuperscript{76} Again, the World Trade Organization theoretically permits states to subsidize their agricultural sectors, however, once again (note the pattern), loan agreements with the World Bank and IMF require these states to reduce those same subsidies. Consequently, farmers in India purchase subsidized Monsanto seeds incentivized by the promise of profitable yields.\textsuperscript{77} However, in addition to often disappointing yields, Monsanto modifies these seeds to prevent re-planting, leaving most farmers without profits or seed.\textsuperscript{78} Lacking any feasible alternatives, these farmers must then take out loans to purchase more dysfunctional seed year after year, thus beginning a cycle of increasing debt that leads thousands to end their lives in despair.\textsuperscript{79}

A similar pattern of structured violence occurs in Africa where international trade agreements incentivize many African nations to import US subsidized food commodities prioritizing their own domestic production for export.\textsuperscript{80} The result is millions of children who die every year due to malnutrition.\textsuperscript{81} However, Leech also explores the necro-economics of the pharmaceutical industry. Capitalism incentivizes pharmaceutical companies and medicinal research institutions to develop profitable drugs, including those referred to as ‘lifestyle drugs’ (drugs that treat non-threatening, often cosmetic, concerns such as acne, baldness, wrinkles, impotence, etc.) and those treating diseases most prevalent in affluent states, in addition to exploiting weak regulations to experiment on vulnerable populations. These economic factors, and more, ultimately resulted in an AIDS epidemic that cost millions in terms of human lives.\textsuperscript{82} In summation, Leech writes

\begin{quote}
An additional $6 billion a year would have ensured that all children in the global South received a basic education; meanwhile, $8 billion was being spent annually on cosmetics in the United States. Similarly, Europeans spent $11 billion a year on ice cream, $2 billion more than the amount required
\end{quote}
to provide safe drinking water and adequate sanitation for everyone in the South. And the $17 billion
that Americans and Europeans spend annually on pet food would easily have provided basic health
care for everyone in the South.\textsuperscript{83}

The cost-benefit analysis that weighs the trade-offs of sustaining a life of luxury that includes ice-cream and Viagra, against human lives, one may note, is a form of necro-economics considerably more vulgar than that theorized by Adam Smith. The acceptance of those trade-offs and the indifference to their cost is also cruel.

Leech concludes his analysis of case studies with a final example that connects the structural imperatives of capitalism to ecocide (the destruction of the environment).\textsuperscript{84} The pursuit of greater returns on profit that is intrinsic to capitalism requires an ever-expanding base of resource inputs and an ever-increasing output of emissions and waste. Where the solution to poverty is presented as more growth in the South, this puts even more pressure on planetary systems already reaching a breaking point.\textsuperscript{85} Perversely, not only are the benefits of industrial and extractive development in the south still largely reaped by the north (thus failing to alleviate the conditions of poverty sufficiently), but these processes will also incite further ecological distress in those same exploited states.\textsuperscript{86} Of course, it is worth mentioning that anthropocentrism constrains Leech’s analysis. The scale of violence and cruelty observable in the global system would increase exponentially if one factored the non-human (plant and animal) into the analysis, as many have suggested.\textsuperscript{87}

No sole case that Leech analyzes, nor any combination thereof, constitutes structural genocide. Leech’s central argument is that each of these examples (the immiseration of farmers, death from treatable diseases, and ecocide) are intrinsic to the global capitalist system (hence their structured repetition across disparate geographies). They are not anomalous but perfectly
consistent with the necro-economics of global capitalism—‘foreseeable and preventable.’ Foreseeable, preventable, yet widely accepted as necessary and inevitable, this moral offence is what motivates critiques such as Leech’s and Pogge’s/Blunt’s. Leech addresses the perceived ethical failure by displacing responsibility from individuals to the inherent dynamics/logics of the system that exceed single individual’s capacities and thus responsibilities. This is an imperfect solution for two reasons. First, foreseeability is not synonymous with intentionality, and it is not clear why one should consider genocide to be the outcome of the structure and not a secondary (if not severe) accident of a more recognizable purpose (for instance, economic growth). Second, displacing intentionality from subjects to structure seems to foreclose the possibility of acting onto that structure in a desirable way. On the one hand, the intention of the structure (genocide) is not the intention of any one individual or collectivity, and yet, is it not these same individuals and collectives who perpetuate and legitimate the structure? Since Blunt’s analysis concentrates on the criminal aspect of global poverty, rather than the structural, he offers a more satisfying account of intent, minus the clarity afforded by a structural analysis.

Having established the actus reas (guilty act) Blunt turns to considering the necessary mens rea (guilty mind) required to constitute a crime against humanity pursuant to articles 7.1.k and 7.2.e-g of the Rome statute. Blunt considers three occasions when intent is set aside in international criminal law: “command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, and wilful blindness or recklessness.” Though all three have the potential to clarify the ambiguous culpability implicated in global poverty, it is the claim of recklessness that he believes best suits the circumstances. Where willful blindness implies the intentional avoidance of information that an agent believes would be criminal, recklessness merely requires that an agent act “in a course of action that has foreseeable harmful consequences.” Accordingly, though “the impoverishment of millions of people and
subsequent poverty-related deaths may not have been the direct aim” it was a foreseeable harmful consequence. For instance, the purpose of Mao Zedong’s policies during China’s “Great Leap Forward” was not the consequent deaths of over 45 million people. Blunt suggests that “the global poor have been the grist mill of a more successful leap forward.” The “progress” enjoyed by affluent societies comes at the cost of global poverty around the globe, perpetuated by the reckless actions of the former. Blunt thus provides a more satisfying explanation for the relationship between intent and outcome than Leech, but without relating to the global system of capitalism.

The penumbra with which Pogge, Blunt, and Leech grapple is the subject at the center of necro-economics (homo economicus). Where Leech recognizes that global poverty is an intrinsic condition of capitalism’s structural violence, he nevertheless misses the processes of subjectivation that produce the necro-economic subject. Likewise, where Blunt accounts for the responsibility of affluent states and their citizens in perpetuating global immiseration, he fails to account for the ways that global capitalism conditions this behavior. Next, I show how the subjectivation of the necro-economic subject fills the gap between structural violence and its acceptance.

III. Necro-bureaucracies

The word genocide was coined by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in response to the holocaust, and indeed, it is precisely the memory of the holocaust that provokes Pogge’s condemnation of global poverty. In her famous report on Otto Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, political theorist Hannah Arendt recalls the startling insignificance of the man to be tried for orchestrating the annihilation of the Jewish people. Eichmann, as Arendt perceived him, did not resemble a monster consistent with the magnitude of his crimes. Despite the cruelty of the outcome, Eichmann’s actions were the product of an insignificant personality, rather than a cruel
one. Correct in her estimation of Eichmann or not, Arendt’s reflections on the trial forever troubled what had been common sense to many: that vicious acts implied vicious people. How could “ordinary men” commit such shocking cruelty?96 This is the same question Pogge and Blunt, and Leech ask when confronting the billions of victims of global poverty and the billions of people who, to varying degrees, enable the system that perpetuates their immiseration. To that extent, I now turn to Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis of the relationship between modern technologization and genocide to show how the global economy inculcates cruelty.

Bauman’s analysis of genocide and Montag’s analysis of necro-economics both begin by internalizing the presumed ‘other’ of the systems they critique. Where, in Montag’s case, this was the “wound of wealth”—poverty—considered external to capitalism, for Bauman it is the holocaust, often presented as an exception to modern civilization that must be interpreted as an always present potential of modern processes. “The Holocaust,” he writes, “was born and executed in our modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and at the peak of human cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a problem of that society, civilization and culture.”98 The brutality and extremity of the holocaust was a product of distinctly modern rationalities and technologies,99 many of which are also intrinsic to global capitalism.

According to Bauman, there are two antithetical ways to explain the holocaust:100 the first is to argue that historical circumstances catalyzed an ‘all too human’ cruelty to spread throughout Europe.101 The second is to see modern civilization as substituting “artificial and flexible patterns of human conduct for natural drives,” thereby rendering “possible a scale of inhumanity and destruction which had remained inconceivable as long as natural predispositions guided human action.”102 Bauman prefers the latter explanation, namely that “the typically modern, technological-bureaucratic patterns of action and the mentality they institutionalize, generate and
sustain and reproduce” inhibit aversions to cruelty. Those who were complicit in the holocaust violated every human code of morality, ethics, and law. Those perpetrators, Bauman contends, could not have been ignorant to this moral fact, and yet these instincts were effectively inhibited. Two processes were conducive to that effect, which are also essential to the functioning of the global economy: the first is the functional division of labour, and the second is the substitution of technical for moral responsibility.

The division of labour into functional parts creates distance between each contributor and the outcome, in the case of global capitalism: widespread inequality and poverty. However, since everyone’s role in maintaining this outcome is sufficiently atomized, the consequences of one’s actions are either completely confused, unknown, or effectively concealed. “Even in abstract,” Bauman observes, “purely notional knowledge of the final outcome is redundant, and certainly irrelevant as far as the success of [the individual’s] own part of the operation goes.” Bauman observes that the functional division of labour inhibited people’s awareness in carrying out tasks conducive to genocide because it shifted the relevant questions from ‘is this right?’ to ‘is this done right?’ Namely, has the subject performed the task correctly? “To put it bluntly,” Bauman writes, “the result is the irrelevance of moral standards for the technical success of the bureaucratic operation.” The intent of global capitalism, contra Leech, might not be structural genocide. Yet, even if one substitutes for this goal something more widely recognizable, such as economic growth, it remains that the division of labour between millions of consumers and producers achieves a comparable erasure of moral standards for technical efficacy in performing well: finding the best price, producing the optimum output, and getting the most return on one’s investment.

An equally important consequence of bureaucratization is the dehumanization of the objects of the bureaucratic operation. This is especially effective when the operation distances
subjects from one another and reduces them to quantitative measures (such as statistics). Here Bauman, in discussing the transportation of victims, refers directly to financial and monetary systems of exchange where “for most bureaucrats, even such a category as cargo would mean too strict a quality-bound restriction. They deal only with the financial effects of their actions. Their object is money.” He continues,

Money is the sole object that appears on both input and output ends, and pecunia, as the ancients shrewdly observed, definitely non olet. As they grow, bureaucratic companies seldom allow themselves to be confined to one qualitatively distinct area of activity. They spread sideways, guided in their movements by a sort of lucrotropism – a sort of gravitational pulling force of the highest returns on their capital.¹⁰⁹

Money is the ultimate translator of difference to a single measurement of value. When businesses, NGOs, and governments reduce the costs and consequences of global capitalism to their abstract monetary value, the victims disappear between rows of spreadsheets. For many states and non-governmental organizations, economic growth, measured as an increase in gross domestic product, is the measure of modernization and thus, progress. Bureaucratization seeks the “optimal solution,” and “what matters is the efficiency and lowering of costs of their processing,”¹¹⁰ not the consequential outcome. As it pertains to the global economy, its purpose is not to ‘let die’ millions of people, its purpose is economic growth. The necro-economic critique nevertheless insists that death is not an externality to this purpose but a means to the end of economic equilibrium, i.e., growth.

Turning to Stanley Milgram’s infamous studies on obedience and authority, Bauman suggests that Milgram showed (and the Holocaust confirms) that cruelty is social. Summarizing Milgram, Bauman writes
cruelty correlates with certain patterns of social interaction much more closely than it does with personality features or other individual idiosyncrasies of the perpetrators. *Cruelty is social* [my emphasis] in its origin much more than it is characterological. Surely some individuals tend to be cruel if cast in a context which disempowers moral pressures and legitimates inhumanity.¹¹¹

When one is placed in a situation where the consequences of one’s actions are far removed psychically (the person becomes a number), physically (the person is far removed), and causally (one’s actions are one in a chain of countless mediations), it is easy to commit actions that are cruel in consequence if not in intent. In such circumstances, everyone is responsible, and no one is. Responsibility is fragmented and diffused across a network of participants. It becomes, in Bauman’s words “free-floating.”¹¹² A situation of free-floating responsibility is one in which “moral authority” has been “incapacitated” since one’s responsibility for the outcome, to which one’s actions have contributed is disintegrated across a network of action.¹¹³ Bauman concludes that “the organization as a whole is an instrument to obliterate responsibility.”¹¹⁴ Such an organization is cruel in that it produces cruel outcomes, and in that it produces cruel subjects.

The bureaucratic machine that enabled ordinary Germans to commit unfathomable atrocities was an a-moralizing machine, one that eradicated feelings of responsibility for extreme cruelty. The global economy mimics this machine in two significant ways. First, there is a division of labour. This not only refers to the globalization of supply and production chains. The division of labour herein also refers to the separate actions, choices, and trajectories that perpetuate a global necro-economy in which millions suffer. It is not a single corporation, a single consumer, a single CEO, but the amalgamation of disparately related actions that end in ecocide, famine, or an AIDS epidemic. Usually, a specific actor is not responsible, rather the result arises from the actions of a multitude of actors behaving ‘rationally’ within the constraints of their economic role (as producer,
consumer, investor, etc.), some may even aspire to philanthropy. What matters to the economic subject is not the outcome, but the effectiveness with which they achieve narrow objectives, which are generally reducible to achieving more with greater efficiency. This is the second important way in which the global economy mimics Bauman’s a-moralizing machine, namely, the substitution of moral with technical responsibility. Obviously, both processes distance and alienate subjects from other subjects and the consequences of their actions. The necro-economic subject is thus they for whom responsibility to others is obliterated.

Markets also produce the specific ontology of command through which necro-economic subjects are made cruel. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni once suggested that Milgram showed “the latent Eichmann” hidden in ordinary men (Etzioni 1968; cited in Bauman 2000). This might be true, and yet for Eichmann and for Milgram’s subjects, command activates latent cruelty. If the real Eichmann was a thoughtless cog in a genocidal machine filled to the brim with other thoughtless cogs, there were nevertheless those (few or many) truly capable of wielding and inflicting cruelty who commanded and perpetrated acts that culminated in genocide. However, this is not the case with the structural violence perpetrated through global capitalism. For Adam Smith, the market, not a sovereign, issues the commands to which merchants and workers must respond. Today, neoliberalism pushes certain of Smith’s tenets to an extreme, including a quasi-religious fidelity to the market. As a result, the command to which the necro-economic subject must respond is not non-existent but is issued from nowhere.

**Conclusion**

Necro-economics refers to economies that sanction the death of millions to preserve the functioning of the economic order. Rather than allowing such an arrangement to interrupt one’s self-interested behaviour, Montag’s version of Adam Smith emboldens one to trust in the good
providence of the market. The result might not be utopia per se, but the best of what is nonetheless feasible. Adam Smith’s economic theodicy is a necro-economics that grounds collective life on collective death. Necro economies do not emerge inevitably, nor is accepting such an arrangement necessary. On the contrary, they emerge in particular cultural milieus and require properly calibrated subjects purged of impeding moral sentiments.

Blunt (through Pogge) and Leech each identify necro-economic tendencies of global capitalism. However, both analyses are silent on the unique subjectivity crafted by the systems they critique. It is untrue to say of Pogge’s citizenry, who legitimize a system that inflicts suffering on millions, act with cruelty. Inversely, Leech’s account replaces subjects entirely with the structural determinants of the system. Instead, following critiques advanced by Bauman in his reflections on modern social structures and genocide, I proposed that the global economy mediates interactions between subjects in such a way as to obliterate responsibility. Contemporary necro-economics are cruel because cruelty is what they demand from, and inculcate within, economic subjects. Furthermore, efforts to reform the global economy without radical change fail to overcome its necro-economic tendencies since this cruelty is intrinsic to the functioning of the global economy. One thus returns to Pogge’s initial conceptualization of institutional violations accompanied by the negative imperative to withhold support, i.e., to reject outright, global capitalism. It is not sufficient, however, to withhold support; one must also resist the positive imperative to become cruel.

1 Ahmed et al., “Inequality Kills.”


4 Montag, 7.

5 Montag, 7.

6 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76.

7 Mbembe, Necropolitics.

8 Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer.

9 Agamben.

10 Mbembe, Necropolitics.


12 Montag, 12–13.

13 Montag, 13.

14 Montag, 13.

15 Montag, “Necro-Economics: Adam Smith and Death in the Life of the Universal.”


18 Montag, 14.

19 Montag, 14.

20 Montag, 15.

21 for that disputation see Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts; Sen, Poverty and Famines.


27 Montag, “Necro-Economics: Adam Smith and Death in the Life of the Universal,” 16.

28 Montag, 16.


30 Blaney and Inayatullah, 12.

31 Blaney and Inayatullah, 1–3.

32 Blaney and Inayatullah, 15.

33 Blaney and Inayatullah, 21.

34 Blaney and Inayatullah, 24.

35 Blaney and Inayatullah, 25.

36 Blaney and Inayatullah, 202.

37 Blaney and Inayatullah, 202–3.

38 Blaney and Inayatullah, 2.


42 Blunt, “Is Global Poverty a Crime against Humanity.”

Blunt, “Is Global Poverty a Crime against Humanity.”

Blunt, 6.

Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”


Blunt, 25.

Blunt, 8.

Blunt, 15.

Blunt, 15.

Blunt, 17.

Blunt, 33.

Blunt, 33.

Blunt, 34.

Blunt, 33; citing Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, *Modern Slavery*; Kara, see also “Modern Slavery”; Landman and Silverman, “Globalization and Modern Slavery.”


63 Leech, 11.

64 Leech, 11.


66 Robinson, Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity.


68 United Nations, “CPPCG,” art. II.


70 A point further explored by Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, “Structural Violence as a Form of Genocide.”


72 Leech, 23.

73 Leech, 26.


75 Balamuralidhar Posani, “Farmer Suicides and The Political Economy of Agrarian Distress in India”; Carleton, “Crop-Damaging Temperatures Increase Suicide Rates in India”; Hebous and Klonner, “Economic Distress and Farmer Suicides in India: An Econometric Investigation”; Merriott, “Factors Associated with the Farmer Suicide Crisis in India”; Mohanty, “‘We Are Like
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84 White, “Climate Change, Ecocide and Crimes of the Powerful.”

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90 Leech, 31.

91 Somin, “Remembering the Biggest Mass Murder in the History of the World.”


93 Power, A Problem from Hell; Schabas, Genocide in International Law.


95 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem.

96 Browning, Ordinary Men.

97 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics.

98 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust. [Electronic Resource], 11.

99 Bauman, 125–29.

100 Bauman, 139.

101 Bauman, 139.

102 Bauman, 140.

103 Bauman, 139.

104 Bauman, 143.

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106 Bauman, 145.

107 Bauman, 148.

108 Bauman, 148.

109 Bauman, 149.

110 Bauman, 150–51.
111 Bauman, 231.

112 Bauman, 227.

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