Abstract

Although recognised, John Stewart Mill’s Kantian influences have not been thoroughly discussed. For my discussion, I draw largely upon the Kantian principles of the duty of virtues scheme. This take on neo-Kantian autonomy theories is appropriate to my interpretation of Mill’s individuality. I show that such a revision of autonomy, which draws from Mill’s liberalism by means of libertarian principles, is rooted in the Kantian duty of virtues scheme. In this line of argument, I re-situate contemporary neo-Kantian personal autonomy theories within contemporary discourses of political liberalism and in liberal normative ethics. I suggest an alternative to Kantian autonomy on the basis of Mill’s individuality, on a theoretical level, but also to initiate a discussion of the significance of the above for current political discourses on liberalism.
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**Keywords**

Autonomy; Individuality; Liberty; Neo-Kantianism; Political Liberalism; Virtue Ethics

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