Hegel as geographer: From geographische Grundlage to Spatial fix
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Abstract
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) established a turning point between the epochs of the premodern and the modern with his dialectic. It was a period of enlightenment in which religion lost the significance of the only factor of social integration, thus diminishing (disappearing) its cohesive power. There was a “certain gap” that needed to be filled, that is, define a new form (mind, power, practices) that will provide new meaning and content to the coming epoch of modernity. Hegel and his students believed in the dialectic of the Enlightenment, in which the mind should replace the power of religion, and its principle of subjectivity essentially determines the new (modern) age. We can now return to the elements of Hegel’s geographical thought, which is best represented by the term “geographical basis” (geographische Grundlage). It forms the basis for understanding Hegel’s geographical thought, within which three notions exist: space, territory, and a set of regional-geographical questions, including geographical determinism, that best reflects Ritter’s notion of Erdindividuum. The common denominator of various contemporary critical reviews of Hegel’s geographical work is the denial of the dialectic of idealism (absolute idea), while individual specifics can be grouped in two directions. One consists of the successors of the Left Hegelians (Marxists and critical geographers) such as Harvey (1981), Anuchin (1987), Lefebvre (1991), Massey (1995), Peet (1998), Elden (2001), Timár (2003) and Soja (2013). Their general criticisms relate to issues of capitalism (unequal distribution of capital) and imperialism; relativization of “moral climatology” and geohistory. The second champion is the successor to the ideas of right-wing Hegelians (liberals and neoconservatives), who do not consider Hegel relevant to contemporary Anglo-American geographical thought (Glacken, 1967), emphasize his Eurocentrism (Unwin, 1992; Gregory, 1998) or emphasize his racist views. 1992).

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Abstract: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) established a turning point between the epochs of the premodern and the modern with his dialectic. It was a period of enlightenment in which religion lost the significance of the only factor of social integration, thus diminishing (disappearing) its cohesive power. There was a “certain gap” that needed to be filled, that is, define a new form (mind, power, practices) that will provide new meaning and content to the coming epoch of modernity. Hegel and his students believed in the dialectic of the Enlightenment, in which the mind should replace the power of religion, and its principle of subjectivity essentially determine the new (modern) age. We can now return to the elements of Hegel’s geographical thought, which is best represented by the term ”geographical basis” (geographische Grundlage). It forms the basis for understanding Hegel’s geographical thought, within which three notions exist: space, territory, and a set of regional-geographical questions, including geographical determinism, that best reflect Ritter’s notion of Erdindividuum. The common denominator of various contemporary critical reviews of Hegel’s geographical work is the denial of the dialectic of idealism (absolute idea), while individual specifics can be grouped in two directions. One consists of the successors of the Left Hegelians (Marxists and critical geographers) such as: Harvey (1981), Anuchin (1987), Lefebvre (1991), Massey (1995), Peet (1998), Elden (2001) and Soja (2013). Their general criticisms relate to issues of capitalism (unequal distribution of capital).
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Keywords: Hegel, geographische Grundlage , Erdindividuum, space, territory, spatial fix.

1. Introduction

Hegel was educated in Stuttgart and Tübingen, and began his academic career as a teacher (Stuttgart), then as a private assistant professor at the University (Jena), director of the grammar school (Nuremberg) and finally, university professor and rector (Heidelberg, Berlin). Since he lived and worked only within the German-speaking area, and was not a great traveller, the question of the origin and source of the numerous geographical laws and facts present in the mentioned works arises. The answer lies in his acquaintance with the first scientific geographers, Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and Carl von Ritter (1779-1859), whom he met upon his arrival at the University of Berlin11He previously worked at the University of Heidelberg, and after Fichte’s death, he became a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin (1818). By the way, this University was founded in 1810, and the first rector was Wilhelm von Humboldt, the older brother of Alexander von Humboldt. Especially valuable to him were Ritter’s regional geographical works [Die Erdkunde ]22The full title of this 19-volume edition is Geography in relation to nature and human history [Die Erdkunde im Verhältniss zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen ], and was published in the period 1819-1859., which he met here for the first time and about which he expressed personal enthusiasm. It is obvious that they were very welcome to him, because that geographical knowledge is recognized in his individual works.

Unlike Ritter, Hegel had a far more complex relationship with Alexander von Humboldt. According to Pinkard 33Extensively described in Ch. 15 ”Home: 1827-31”, section Growing Problems: A. von Humboldt and Schelling (2000), many contemporaries viewed Humboldt as one of Hegel’s opponents, who saw "some merit in Hegel’s philosophy" but viewed his overall philosophical project less favourably than others. These attitudes of Humboldt gained in importance after his return from extensive travels in South and Central America (1799-1804), when he gave a series of public lectures on the physical-geographical description of the world in Berlin. The lectures were a great success, and among the large audience, in addition to the king and members of the Government, was Hegel’s wife Maria, who conveyed to him Humboldt’s negative comments on his work:

"In one of the lectures, Humboldt carried out a poorly disguised attack on all post-Kantian philosophy - in other words, on Hegel. Humboldt began this lecture with a protest against the kind of "metaphysics" that takes place "without knowledge acquired through knowledge and experience" and which progresses through narrower "schematism", as he said, since medieval scholasticism" (Pinkard, 2000: 610).

Hegel was deeply hurt by these assessments, and the dispute with Humboldt was overcome with the mediation of a mutual friend von Ense, to whom Humboldt showed notes for his sixth lecture (but not for the fifth in which he mentioned Hegel). After Hegel’s death, von Humboldt made it clear that he did intend to criticize Hegel, but that the real focus of his critique was Schelling and all his followers who dealt with his popular natural philosophy [Naturphilosophie ]. He also criticized Hegel’s geographical descriptions of South America [Vortlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte ]44First printed in 1837., after discovering “completely inaccurate facts about South America and the Indian world [die indische Velt “], noting that „at the same time, I do not fail to recognize what is great in Hegel’s work”. Therefore, „Hegel’s geographical descriptions of the New World did not have much credibility, and his philosophical project had little more” (Ibidem, 611).

During Hegel’s time, discipline was burdened by the dichotomy of school and secular philosophy, and after his departure, this teaching was reflected in the establishment of different directions within philosophical thought. In the post-Hegelian period, Habermas (1988) recognizes the development of three directions, the first of which are left-wing Hegelians55The first generation of these philosophers, according to Habermas, included: Rosenkrantz, Hinrich and Oppenheim (Young Hegelians, socialists), the second group are right-
wing Hegelians Habermas classifies in this group of philosophers: Marx, Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno (conservatives, liberals), and Nietzsche. The Left Hegelians distanced themselves from Hegel’s notion of “intelligent reality and its factuality, contingency and actuality” and put the notion of existence in the foreground. For Feuerbach it is the sentimental existence of internal and external nature, for Kierkegaard it is the historical existence of the individual, while Marx insists on the material battle of the economic foundations of coexistence. Unlike Hegel, they do not have a reconciliation between “subjective and absolute nature, subjective and absolute spirit, objective spirit and absolute knowledge”, but they remain attached to the basic figure of Hegel’s opinion. For them, historical events are determined by “super subjective and interconnected processes of learning and teaching, which explains other meanings of discourse: in addition to radical historical thinking, critique of the subject-centred mind, exposed position of the intellectual and responsibility for historical continuity and discontinuity” (Ibidem, 55-56).

The right-wing Hegelians developed their teaching as a critique of Marxism, and they follow Hegel in the belief that “the substance of the state and religion will compensate for the unrest of civil society as soon as the subjectivity of revolutionary consciousness, which sparks unrest, disappears before objective insight into the mind.” The absolutely set rationality of reason is now expressed in the ecstasy of socialist ideas; against these false critics only the metacritical insight of philosophers must be affirmed. Nietzsche, finally, wants to expose the dramaturgy of that whole play, in which both appear - a revolutionary hope and a reaction to it” (Ibidem: 57).

Diagram 1: An overview of the main philosophical directions during modernity

The previous diagram represents an attempt to visualize Habermas’s (1988) view of the course of modernity, so at this level of acquaintance with the foundations of modernity, the focus will be on two elements, the first of which relates to recognizing the historicist elements of this era. Unlike Kant, who expresses the modern world in the "form of a thought building" and who did not recognize the modern era in the way it was interpreted during the last century, Hegel believed that modern times are characterized by a structure of self-relation or the principle of subjectivity. According to Habermas, Hegel’s principle of subjectivity has four connotations: a) individualism: in the modern world, every infinitely special uniqueness can emphasize its pretensions; b) the right to criticize: the principle of the modern world requires that what everyone should know be proved to be justified; c) autonomy of action: modern times have the right to be responsible for what we do; d) idealistic philosophy: as a work of modern times, Hegel views philosophy as an idea that knows itself. This means that he understood that the same conditions did not prevail throughout Europe and that it was not a compact space in the social and political sense, so he did not view this principle as a historicist fact related to a particular historical event, but emphasized the key historical processes that are principle affirmed, and these are: The Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French revolution. Karl Marx interprets the question of modernity through the notion of acceleration.
of life relations leads to the acceleration of modernization, with its centre of gravity in France and England, while other countries lag significantly behind. As an example, he cites the German situation, which according to the "French reckoning of time" in 1843 would not have reached the French level of 1789. That is why Marx states that it is "below the level of history" and that German political modernity is "like a dusty fact of the history of modern nations".

Habermas notes that the achievements of modernity, neither Hegel nor his immediate students ever wanted to question. Therefore, they placed their hope in the dialectic of the Enlightenment in which the mind is considered the equivalent of the unifying power of religion. They developed a concept of mind that should fulfil one such program: "Hegel conceived the mind as the self-knowledge of the absolute spirit, Hegel’s left as the liberating appropriation of productively external but deprived essential forces, and Hegel’s right as a reminiscent compensation of the pain of inevitable divisions" (Ibidem, 74).

We have already mentioned that the depth of Hegel’s scientific thought decisively influenced the further development of philosophical thought, and thus other humanities, social sciences and natural sciences. However, geographers showed little interest in Hegel’s geographical opinion, so a review of his work33It is important to note that the most important works of Hegel are: Phenomenology of Spirit (1808), Logic I-III (1816), Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1817). is very rarely present in historical-geographical and theoretical-geographical representations. Deviations from this are made by Marxist44David Harvey, Doreen Massey and Richard Peet. and critical55Critical geography is one of the variants from the rich tradition of critical research in the social sciences and humanities, which not only interprets the world, but also changes it, and is dedicated to left-wing politics, social justice and free scientific research. geographers, for whom Hegel is important because of the discussion of dialectics, that is a dialectical view of the methods of analysis and synthesis, which were later developed by Marx and Engels. Hegel considered that the dialectical method in all its movements is, at the same time, both analytical and synthetic, which is still important today for a correct understanding of the essence of geography. This topicality stems from the fact that Hegel’s philosophy is considered to have contained dialectical propositions that could be directed against the positivist view in geography, which was dominant for most of the twentieth century. With this Hegel avoided one problem, but created a new one. Namely, he diminished the significance of the metaphysical view of the world, but he therefore took a step towards a deterministic view of the geographical environment, as a causally connected unity of different elements.

Also, it is important to mention that Kant is much closer to geographers, who conducted two geographical courses66See: G. Mutabdžija, Immanuel Kant: The geographer in the civil twilight between premodern and modern. during his entire university career, while this was not the case with Hegel. Yet, although he showed a weaker commitment to geography than Kant, Hegel discussed geographical issues in many of his lectures. Considering his entire work, the corpus has a special geographical significance, which consists of: "Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences" [Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse], "Philosophy of Law" [Die Rechtsphilosophie] and subsequently published lectures: "Lectures on the philosophy of world history" [Vorles Philosophie der Weltgeschichte] and "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit" [Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie des subjectiven Geistes]. In these editions, Hegel significantly enriched the theoretical and philosophical foundations of geography, primarily through: defining a new concept of space, the importance of physical geography (primarily climate) for the existence of different human races, as well as the importance of the concept of territory for political philosophy. Bond (2014: 181) tries to generalize Hegel’s geographical thought, so he defines it through his "ideas about space, place and relations between man and the environment". Based on that, he concludes that Hegel’s geographical thought deserves the attention of geographers, because it contributes to: a better understanding of contemporary geographical thought, a more correct interpretation of historical geography in the modern period and emphasizing people’s ability to become progressively more self-aware and freer.

2. The philosophical basis of Hegel’s geographical thought

Nevertheless, the geographical aspect of Hegel’s work cannot be understood without a brief acquaintance with the basic elements of his philosophy. It was not entirely the original work of Hegel, but was partly
taken from Fichte and represents part of a broader teaching (Fichte-Hegelian) about the unity of theoretical and practical mind. Simeunović (2006: 20) states that “all knowledge, even philosophical and metaphysical, comes from the effective power of the practical mind and has a practical determination. That is what Fichte showed, and what Hegel takes over and concretizes in a comprehensive way.” And this is an example of the growth of scientific knowledge, and to understand Hegel’s geographical thinking, it is necessary to first return to the elements of his dialectical and logic, which form the beginning of his philosophical system. That dialectical, i.e., the dialectical method represents a certain trinity composed of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and can also be characterized as a method of opposition, contradiction and development.

"Hegel, in fact, holds that the opposite is at the same time a necessary contradiction. He argues that the attitude of identity and the attitude of contradiction (i.e., the attitude of the impossibility of contradiction) are not the basic laws of opinion, but that opinion not only can and must imagine the unity of contradictions or contradictions. On the other hand, again the opposite of thesis and antithesis must be avoided. This avoidance of contradictions consists in placing the unity of thesis and antithesis, in synthesis. But as each stage of the absolute idea contains in itself its opposite, the unity of thesis and antithesis obtained by synthesis becomes a new thesis, which opposes itself to a new antithesis, and this opposition represents a new contradiction which has to be resolved by a new synthesis. until one final stage is reached. Putting the antithesis against the thesis represents the negative side, and resolving the contradiction by synthesis represents the positive side of the dialectical method” (Petronijević, 2002: 335).

On the other hand, Hegel’s logic cannot be presented in brief. It is understood as a concept which, in relation to Fichte, contains "an alternative solution to the problem of self-awareness". While for Fichte, logic was a reckoning with the concept of self-consciousness as a reflection that seeks to "explain self-consciousness in a departure from the reflexive model."

„Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness derives precisely from the "radicalization" of the understanding of self-consciousness as reflection. This radicalization aims to make sustainable this problematic "model" of self-awareness, and to account for the "paradoxes" that arise from it. It is precisely these paradoxes that Hegel tried to integrate, not only in his description of self-conscious subjectivity or self, but also in his view of the circular structure which characterizes the absolute subjectivity of the logical "idea" and the philosophical system as a whole” (Millisavljević, 2006: 3).

Because of this, knowledge of the most basic concepts, such as idea, nature and spirit, is necessary for understanding the philosophy of history and its geographical thinking.

"Logos as a system of all logical categories represents a network of reality, what comes to the idea in reality is the very real existence of the ideal. Hegel distinguishes between the idea as a pure thought being and reality because he does not consider space and time, which are forms of real existence, as categories, in other words, that his rationalism is not able to present space and time as categories. What the idea gained by passing into reality is the realization of its logical moments in the spatial and temporal plural. According to Hegel, this transition is to be understood in such a way that the idea in it is freely alienated from itself, absolutely confident in itself and resting peacefully in itself. Hegel does not understand this transition as a process that happened in time, that is: according to him, the idea as a kingdom of categories did not exist before the real world and at one particular moment of eternity alienated itself and passed into the world, but Hegel believes that this transition from eternity is given: the idea is eternal, and the realization of the idea is eternal. In other words, an idea is to be understood only as an abstract, conceptual side of reality. The idea, passing into nature, alienates itself, but it does so only so that it could appear on a higher level, as a conscious spirit. The idea in its original logical being is still unconscious, because it is pure abstraction; in Nature the idea is also unconscious, but is in concrete form; in the Spirit it is concrete and conscious” (Petronijević, 2002: 340).

Many philosophers emphasize Lukach, Hesle and Habermas who dealt with the early Hegel, because then all his philosophy was born, which was subsequently transformed into a complete system. emphasize that in Hegel's philosophy the category of spirit is "central and bearing, and that in its
significance and content it surpasses all traditional-philosophical views (…), it is an intersubjective category which expresses the general and common, universal and absolutely, never individually”. This is important because this „universal category establishes and reflects the life of the community and the people, which constitutes and constitutes world history and expresses the unity of the human race” (Simeunović, 2005: 8-9).

As with the dialectical method, the threefold division also exists in the philosophy of spirit, whose basic forms derive from the concept of the mind and are made up of: the subjective, the objective, and the absolute spirit. Petronijević (2002) notes that the subjective spirit is an individual consciousness that is “in connection with one body”. Also, while the objective spirit appears in the ”plural of individuals” (social community), the absolute spirit embraces the idea as ”absolute knowledge of itself.”

Table 1: Elements of Hegel’s philosophy of mind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three levels of the ideal</th>
<th>It is presented as:</th>
<th>Interpreters is:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute idea</td>
<td>Idea in itself</td>
<td>Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>An idea outside itself</td>
<td>Philosophy of nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit</td>
<td>An idea for oneself and for oneself</td>
<td>Philosophy of spirit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on: Petronijević, 2002: 336

The objective spirit appears in various forms, as law [das Recht], as individual morality [Moralität] and as social morality [Sittlichkeit] in the form of: family, civil society and the state. In order to understand such a complex Hegel’s philosophical system, it is necessary to try to schematically present the elements of his philosophy of spirit.

Diagram 2: Five levels of the beginning of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit

Based on: Stederot, 2008.

The easiest way to explain this diagram is through a return to Hegel’s concept of philosophy, which is understood as a system in which everything is interconnected and mutually conditioned. Hegel’s system was
initially a system of order in which the basic scientific concepts are assigned to different spheres of science, and which at first glance (see diagram 2), we recognize only as the easiest way to explain this diagram is through a return to Hegel’s concept of philosophy, which is understood as a system in which everything is interconnected and mutually conditioned. Hegel’s system was initially a system of order in which the basic scientific concepts were assigned to different spheres of science, and which at first glance (see diagram 2), we recognize only as natural sciences, anthropology and psychology. However, in reality it is a far wider range of scientific disciplines, which are better understood through this system of order, which is subsequently differentiated at different levels:

"At the first level, it must be decided whether the concept is logical and whether it belongs to the concept of nature or the concept from the sphere of the spirit. After that, the systematization continues in the same way until the appropriate internal differentiations of individual spheres, i.e., in the field of logic to the spheres of being, essence and concept, in the field of nature to the spheres of mechanics, physics and organics, and in the field of spirit to the spheres of subjective mind (psychology), objective mind (legal philosophy) and absolute mind (art, religion and philosophy)” (Stederoth, 2008: 82).

Also, Stederoth believes that despite "Hegel’s exclusion of the external order from the development of the concept” there is still a conceptual relationship, which is why the transition from natural philosophy to spiritual philosophy can be conceptually thematized on all five levels:

“Level 1: Concept of nature - Concept of spirit;
Level 2: Organic - Subjective spirit;
Level 3: Animal organism - Anthropology (theory of the soul);
Level 4: Gender process - Natural soul;
Level 5: Death of an individual - Natural traits” (Ibidem, 83).

We can now return to the elements of geographical thinking in Hegel, which derive from his philosophy. With it, the continuity and linear course of modern philosophy ends, and since then we have been talking about modern philosophy, which can be expressed in one sentence: "To understand exactly what happened, we need to return to Hegel, who is a kind of Place de Etoile11A roundabout in the center of Paris from which 12 avenues depart, and in the center of which is the Triumphal Arch. with a monument to politics. and philosophy at the centre” (Lefebvre, 1991; 21).

3. Space

The question of Hegel’s interpretation of space was most zealously dealt with by Marxist geographers, according to whom the question of space originates from the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Law, and who interpreted Hegel as Marx’s intellectual predecessor. This philosophy had a direct influence on early location theories, from von Thunen’s model (1826; 1850), which determined the spatial and functional relations of the pre-industrial city with the agrarian environment, to A. Weber’s (1909) theory of industrial location, which is in itself for the first time generated three groups of factors11It refers to the availability of raw materials, energy and labor; transport costs and agglomerative-deglomerative economic factors.. One of the most significant reviews of this Hegel influence is provided by Harvey (1981), who states that von Thunen, under the significant influence of the Philosophy of Law, reformulated his starting points:

“Although not referring to Hegel, von Tinen’s concerns in the second account of The Isolated State are almost identical to those expressed in Philosophy of Law, a passage that deals with the internal contradictions of civil society. Like Hegel, von Thunen rejects the idea that the ”invisible hand of the market” can exploit universal egoism for the benefit of all. He points to the inevitable deterioration of civil society in the absence of any corrective measures. It also explores internal and external transformations as a means of reconciling the contradictions inherent in civil society. Both the linguistic and the conceptual apparatus are very Hegelian. The parallels are too close to be random” (Harvey, 1981: 3).
Von Thunen’s work is referred to by Gregory and Urri (1985: 1), who state that Hegel’s political philosophy, which enabled the rejection of an autonomous, purely geometrically based theory of location, conspicuously springs from it. For Anuchin (1977), Hegel’s philosophy represented the highest form of objective idealism and had a strong influence on geography, because he considered geographical problems in accordance with his general-philosophical and natural-philosophical concepts. Anucin refers to Engels, who interprets Hegel’s definition of nature as simply “the alienation of an idea incapable of development through time.” It can develop its multiple properties only in space, and thus, it is doomed to eternal repetition of the same processes. Because:

"The main contradiction of Hegelian theory concerns the relationship between the dialectical method, which observes all objects, phenomena and processes in continuous development, and the idealistic metaphysical system, which limits this development to certain previously formulated boundaries, in the system of categories developed by Hegel in his Science of logic. As an idealist, Hegel attributed the development to a unique realm of the spirit, which is revealed in various areas of human activity, and especially in the sphere of ideology (religion, art, philosophy). On the other hand, matter is, according to Hegel, something inert and passive and, unlike spirit, it is not capable of self-development” (Anuchin, 1977: 82).

From a geographical point of view, the basis for these views lies in Hegel’s (1987: 212-221) interpretation of space and time22Elaborated within the first section of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature - Mechanics, § 253 - § 261.. From the description of space that is "being-outside-itself, and continuous, because this extravagance is still completely abstract and has no definite difference", some geographers (e.g., Bond, 2014: 7) draw a dry conclusion about Hegel’s position on space which is "dead, fixed, non-dialectical and immobile." Also, in contrast to space, time represents "wealth, fertility, life, dialectics". These statements deserve a broader explanation, which is made possible by Hegel’s dialectic of nature, and which consists of mechanics, physics, and organics. The task of mechanics is to dialectically derive space, time and matter:

"According to Hegel, space is the abstract existence of one outside the other, it is pure simultaneity that corresponds to the very basic difference between nature and idea, i.e., exterior. Thus, understood in the abstract, space is continuous and there are no differences in it yet. However, in a continuous space, a difference must be made, and the first difference is the three dimensions. Hegel wants to dialectically deduce that there cannot be more than three of them, and he does so by understanding the point as a negation of space, but as a negation that remains in space. Based on it, differences in space begin. One cannot stay on a point, because a point is both in space and not in space, and this contradiction is resolved by the point becoming spatial, i.e.: by making a line from a point. This again denies itself in the surface, and the negation of the surface is the placement of the surface as the boundaries of the body, that is, the placement of three-dimensional space. Negation must, however, go further, space itself must be denied, and the negation of the whole space must again be a point, or something similar to it, the negation of space represents a point that is not in space, and that is the moment of time. The point in time is variable, not constant. In this way, time represents the changing given of the individual in nature, or time is just an observed becoming. Further, space as a whole represents a thesis, time an antithesis, and their synthesis will be a synthesis of a point in space and a point in time, and that synthesis is a place. But one place presupposes another place and passes into it, so the negation of a place is a synthesis of a plurality of places in space and time or movement. Movement is such a synthesis of space and time that space decays in time and time in space. As such, movement is a contradiction, and the negation of that contradiction is the placing of a peaceful synthesis of space and time, of matter. Therefore, dialectical matter emerges from space and time (Petronijević, 1982: 489).

Especially important is Lefebvre’s (1991: 19-21) position on space33Henri Lefebvre, The production of space , 1991., as one of the key thinkers for the emergence of postmodernism in geography. He sublimates Hegel’s idea of space and time so that "according to Hegelianism, historical time gives birth to the space that the state occupies and rules (...) time dominated by repetition and circulation, overwhelmed by the establishment of immovable space in which the place and environment of the realized reason loses all meaning". All these attitudes about space originate from Hegel’s dialectic, which over time requires different interpretations:

"Dialectics is on the agenda again. But it is no longer Marx’s dialectic, just as Marx’s was no longer Hegel’s
Today, dialectics no longer adheres to historicism and historical time, nor to a temporal mechanism such as thesis-antithesis-synthesis or affirmation-negation-negation of negation. To discover space, to discover what is contained in it and what it is used for, means to return to the dialectic; analysis will reveal the contradiction of space" (Soja, 2013: 63, according to: Lefebvre, 1976)

Analysing Lefebvre’s work (1992; 2006) and his review of Hegel, the young critical geographer L. Pohl (2019) gives a very clear assessment of Hegel’s contribution to the understanding of the concepts of space and time. He mentions three important determinants of his philosophy and characterizes it as: basically dogmatic, because “it establishes a total system where being and nothing merge into each other”; fetishized, because of the topological understanding of space that should be rejected because “the problem of philosophical closure increases by forming abstract space without remnants of the outside”, and turned only to the present. For him, “it is a slave of the present without any recognition of time and change” (Pohl, 2019: 290).

4. Territory

In order to sublimate Hegel’s geographical thought into three characteristic notions, it is necessary to group his views on various geographical issues into a broader concept. Shapiro (2015) calls this concept Hegel’s geophilosophy,22Poststructuralist concept, created by G. Deleuze and F. Gattari in their last work “What is philosophy”, 1995., and which includes questions about: territory, state, peoples, world history, and religions. The modern concept of territory has been established after the Peace of Westphalia33Agreement between Catholics and Protestants of Central Europe (1648), which defined the principles of sovereignty and equality between states in order to establish lasting peace and friendship between states, with a mutually acceptable system of international law, based on internationally binding treaties. See: Mutabdžija, 2020., which achieved a strong expression of the political significance and power of social space through this notion. Basically, the notion of territory had the meaning of a limited spatial scope, primarily in the domain of expressing a certain identity, i.e., it represented the boundary of sovereignty, jurisdiction, administration, and citizenship. This reasoning leads us to a different interpretation of this term in Hegel’s work. On the one hand, due to such properties (identity, sovereignty), the notion of territory is present within Hegel’s political philosophy and is rightly expressed in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. Although he did not write about this in his Lectures (on the subjective spirit and law), there is a direct connection between the concept of territory and his philosophy of spirit, that is, spirit as a universal category that establishes and reflects the life of the community and the people. This is emphasized by Simeunović (2005: 9), claiming that the category of the spirit “makes and constitutes world history and expresses the unity of the human race”.

The second aspect, from the position of the left-wing Hegelians and their emphasis on the importance of practice, is explained by Harvey (2006), who vividly describes important elements of this political philosophy as the basis of the economic theory of capitalist imperialism. In the theoretical foundations of this system, he recognizes the work of Marx and von Thunen, which, in part, served as “a response to the problems Hegel left open, namely the role of geographical expansion and territorial domination of colonialism and imperialism in stabilizing capitalism”. However, the notion of territory also signifies a shortcoming in Hegel’s geographical thought, because this notion is not treated in an essential part of his geographical corpus.44Lectures on the Philosophy of History are meant... The lack of discussion of territory is perhaps understandable, given its attempt to explain the essential geographical division in the world, which stems from the Philosophy of Law (§ 258) and relates to the attempt to explain the development of the state through a philosophical approach: While this stems from an interest in “scientific cognition” [wissenschaftliches Erkennen ], which rejects any concern for the “historical origin of the state”, Bond (2014) mentions a historical approach that stems from Hegel’s personal experience of politics in the Holy Roman Empire and concerns the effectiveness of modern bureaucratic states in the post-Napoleonic period. He calls this particularity55By this, Hegel means communal policy, personal morality and means of subsistence, which defined the geographical sensibility of the average German during most of the 19th century. (§142-246), which in his view slowed down the need for modernization (e.g., labour mobility). Nevertheless, the most important review of Hegel’s vision of the state is provided by Lefebvre’s (2009) explanation of Marx’s critique of Hegel, which is a strong example of...
the Marxist form of critique, expressed in many of his works:

"Hegel’s critique is not just a critique of Hegel’s conception of the state, in order to replace the Marxist theory of the state; the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state is already a theory of the extinction and disappearance of the state. This is a much more thorough critique, which goes much further than a simple analysis of some restrained remarks" (Lefebvre, 2009: 80).

We will return again to Shapiro (2015), who, through geophilosophy, emphasized Derrida’s Jacques Derrida is a French philosopher, one of the first postmodernists and the author of the notion of deconstruction. question about “where the world, the earth or the globe is going and whether it will become a meaningful whole.” He deliberately uses three different terms for the planet, to present the views of three thinkers (Hegel, Nietzsche, and Rosenzweig), the third of whom is the least known Rosenzweig is a German philosopher-theologian, a great supporter of expansionist German geopolitics, which was best reflected in Naumann’s doctrine of Central Europe (Mitteleuropa). As an occupying Austro-Hungarian soldier, he contracted malaria in 1916 near Nis, and was treated in Belgrade. From the hospital, he wrote to his parents about his view of the causes of the war (Kriegsgrund), expressing extremely racist views. His most famous work is The Star of Redemption, and after being blinded by German idealism, theology and personal conflicts, he returned to Judaism.. In his work The Globe, Rosenzweig gives a philosophical account of the boundaries and what Nietzsche calls the "direction of the Earth," but at the same time suggests that the final perspective of the globe is teleological development Teleological development is based on the purpose and harmony of the cosmos, i.e. assuming that there is an order in the universe created by God, and these views were advocated by T. Aquinas and I. Kant.. Shapiro claims that this is contrary to Hegel’s vision “in which is the goal of history, with all its wars, to become geography, the final and inclusive inscription of a common territory”.

From this it can be seen that for Hegel, geography is only a condition of history and that it does not determine the story of freedom, but only represents the soil (aufgehoben) on which it originates. In order not to expand the range of philosophical questions that correspond to poststructuralism (geophilosophy), we will dwell on the concept of world history [Veltgeschichte], which represents the highest degree of development of the objective spirit, the empire in which the state actualizes human freedom on earth” and assumes a certain geography. However, Hegel did not think in the categories of the epochs of the premodern, modern and postmodern, but mentioned as key historical events for the affirmation of the principle of subjectivity: The Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French revolution. In the mentioned Philosophy of History, the whole world-historical process began on cosmological bases and the analogy of the movement of the Sun (external) with world history, which begins in the east (Asia) and ends in the west (Europe). Since there is also an inner sun (self-awareness), it is born in the west and scatters a greater radiance than the outer sun.

Table 2: Overview of the course of World history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World History</th>
<th>World History</th>
<th>Movement of the Sun</th>
<th>Movement of the Sun</th>
<th>Political Form</th>
<th>Freedom</th>
<th>Historical Phase</th>
<th>Principles of Contradiction Phase</th>
<th>Substantial Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Ex.</td>
<td>Inside</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Despotism</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Boy</td>
<td>There is no Arbitrariness</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Greek world</td>
<td>Democracy and aristocracy</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Young Man</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Roman Empire</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Express</td>
<td>Inner Life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>German empire</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>Disappear</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Based on: Hegel’s Philosophy of History

It is necessary to clarify other selected terms in the previous table, which begins with the term world history. It refers to a unique process in which there is a certain regularity and recognizability, and the movement of the Sun served as a metaphor for a dialectic that expresses a certain regularity, but also the opposite in its vertical movement from east to west, but also internal movement related to the world. Histories from the most advanced societies of the West to those of the East. Also, political form is a concept that has been developing since Aristotle, who connected the form of social order (plutocracy, aristocracy, democracy...) with the shape and size of the territory, and Hegel connects the achieved phase of the world-historical process with the political form which is best represented. In a similar way, he recognizes the evolutionary development of society and its dependence on the "subsistence economy", which is based on agricultural and craft production and which, supplemented by local markets, builds, according to this play, the basis of the overall political system. The notion of freedom derives from the notion of the civil, which sees the "creation of the modern world" and its justification in the emancipation of the individual in formal freedom, while the historical phase is a metaphor for comparing individual phases of social development with human life. Here it is convenient to remember those picturesque riddles: "what is it that he walks on four legs in the morning, on two at noon, and on three in the evening"?

Nevertheless, the central place of Hegel’s political philosophy is occupied by the state [der Staat ], which can be connected with the notions of space and time. For Lefebvre (1991: 279), it is the result of the weakness of Hegelianism, but also of his critique, which misunderstood the role of space, because "Hegel's space brought historical time to an end, and the master of space was the state. He perfected the space rationally and really at the same time. " He supports this with examples from the second half of the twentieth century, which we have witnessed:

“The country is consolidating on a global scale. It strives for society (for all societies) in full force; plans and organizes society 'rationally', with the help of knowledge and technology, imposing analogous, if not homologous measures, regardless of the political ideology, historical background or class origin of those in power. The state narrows the time by reducing the differences to repetitions or circles, called "balance", "feedback", "self-regulation", etc. Space in its Hegelian form returns to its own. This modern state is being promoted and imposed as a stable centre - definitely - of (national) societies and spaces. Like the end and meaning of history, just as Hegel predicted, it aligns the social and "cultural" spheres" (Lefebvre, 1991: 23) Harvey (1981) sees the main meaning of the Philosophy of Law in the interpretation of law, morals and various aspects of ethical life as an "objective, institutional spirit", in which Hegel, through the interpretation of the family as a sphere of ethical life dominated by particular and personal altruism, emphasizes the importance of the state. It accomplishes this through civil society as a sphere of "universal egoism," in which each individual seeks to use the other as a means to achieve his or her own goals. All this represents a sphere of "market competition, social division of labour and universal interdependence" within which there is tension between "family and civil society, between private and public spheres of social life", which according to Hegel can be solved only by acquiring universalist consciousness of all actors and objective expression. and consciousness through the institutions of the modern state. The rational state, Hegel argues, can transcend the duality of private and public life and thus restore the broken unity of human existence through a synthesis of the roles of "Homme " and "citoyen ", which Rousseau envisioned as an unbreakable rift within the complex fabric of bourgeois society 1981: 1).

Also, Harvey points to Hegel’s thinking about the emergence of capitalist imperialism and the creation of great social (class) differences, and the modalities of overcoming them. Hegel sees the first solution in significant taxation of the rich, which would create social funds for the poor, but the basic problem would remain unresolved11According to Hegel, civil society is poor to absorb the surpluses of capitalist production, so the problem is not in production, but in the lack of a proportionate number of consumers. He sees another possibility in the civil society initiated by the "internal dialectic" to "cross its own borders and look for markets, and thus the necessary means of subsistence, in other countries that lack goods." From this fact, Hegel derives the necessity of establishing colonies and settling them, interpreting imperialism
and colonialism as a "necessary revolution in overcoming internal contradictions, which are related to any" mature "civil society" (Harvey 1981: 2 according to Hegel, 1989).

It is obvious that Hegel’s attitude inspired Marx22Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, 1843 and Capital, 1873., and then Marxist geographers33A movement of younger geographers, created in the late 1960s and later, who were dissatisfied with the then dominant vision of geography as a technocratic and positivist spatial science. They analyzed the geographical conditions, processes and outcomes of socio-economic systems, primarily capitalism, using the tools of Marxist theory, and the most important representatives are: Harvey, Massey, Wallerstein, Frank, Smith and others., to critically re-examine space by introducing the term "spatial fix" which can interpret Hegel’s notions of the general relationship between the "internal dialectic" of crisis formation44They manifest as excessive accumulation in space, ie. as simultaneous surpluses of capital and labor. and the "external dialectic" of geographical (spatial) release of these excesses. However, Hegel did not explain the relationship between state power and territory, nor the issue of sovereignty and mutual relations of states, but he expressed a kind of geopolitical position by emphasizing that the "size" of the state (Umfang) determines its position in international relations. Through geography (national character and race of peoples, not territory), he understood a limited legal-political entity ruled by the state as the "master of space". Also, important questions of his geophilosophy relate to the question of peoples and religions, and Livingston (1992) mentions his "moral" vocabulary when describing African natives and the indigenous population of America as "poorly cultivated peoples" [schwach gebildeten Volker ], who had "small educational capacity" [von geringer Fähigkeit zur Bildung ].

5. Erdindividuum

It is obvious that Ritter’s regional-geographical descriptions of the continents, as well as their geographical regionalization (typology), enabled Hegel to establish the "geographical foundation" of history [geographische Grundlage ]. In Philosophy of History (Hegel, 1980), in the chapter Geographical Foundations of World History, he provides a very detailed regional-geographical description of the Old and New Worlds, where the synthesis of this description is the geographical regionalization of characteristic areas. This clarifies in more detail the term Erdindividuum 11This term is a derivative of it. Erde -country, Individuum -individual. as a concept of regionalization, which was taken over by Ritter in order to denote a macro-region (e.g., Europe, Africa, Oceania). It refers to something necessary, something that prevails, whereby for Hegel "a closer analysis of this concept belongs to geography". This can be seen from this quote:

"Now we need to list more specific geographical differences and consider them essential, rational differences, as opposed to various random circumstances. There are three characteristic differences:

1. Waterless mountainous areas with its large steppes and plains,
2. Valley plains - an area of crossings intersected and irrigated by large rivers
3. A coastal belt that is directly connected to the sea" (Hegel, 1980: 105-106).

A very significant contribution is recognized in the fact that this "geographical foundation" enabled the transition from natural to spiritual philosophy (subjective spirit), and we still recognize its relevance today. This was beautifully described by Stederoth (2008: 81) in the article Death of Nature is the Awakening of the Spirit 22The title of this work comes from Hegel’s thesis, which he presented in a Lecture on Natural Philosophy (1819)., which considers that this "seemingly unreasonable quote" indicates the background of ecological and ecological-philosophical debates and seems to express "the basic problem of the whole philosophy is limited to science, in so far as it tends to absolutize the human mind, which is responsible for the ecological misery of our present. " In the domain of geographical critique of Hegel’s work, a certain regularity in the recognition of important themes and concepts can be followed, with geographical determinism33Obviously, elements of Aristotle’s Meteorology are present here, which mentions five heat zones and the impossibility of living in the polar and tropical (torid) areas. most often mentioned as a shortcoming. Hegel in a general form emphasized the indirect influence of the natural environment on the life of society and established the existence of a cause-and-effect relationship between them, as can be seen from this quote:
"It is not our concern to get acquainted with the country as an external locality, but the type and character of the people who are the descendants of that soil is closely connected with the natural type of locality. This character is nothing more or less than the regime and form in which nations appear in world history and their place and position in it. The importance of nature must be neither exaggerated nor belittled" (Habermas, 1988: 84)

Although Hegel has failed to address the role of the geographical environment in society, we should not treat the influence of his philosophy on the development of theoretical geography as something negative, although such views are occasionally encountered. Nevertheless, his dialectic motivated geographers to establish a new, more correct approach to the objects of study of geographical science. This new approach was derived in different ways and stemmed from Hegel’s understanding of physical geography, through which he built a relationship to human races and world history. This was the first element to be hit by critics, and among the first to do so was F. Ratzel (1882). He noticed in Hegel’s works the overemphasized importance of climate for history, which he writes about in Anthropogeography44F. Ratzel (1844-1904), author of the famous work Anthropogeography or basic principles of application of geography to history [AnthropoGeographie, oder Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte]. In the chapter "Philosophy of History and Geography" he gives a review of Hegel’s work and states that in "Philosophy of History" there is the most obvious "atrophy of the concept of history", which is the result of schematic conceptions of Hegel, who considered that "only history is an essential epoch in development of the spirit". The consequence is that peoples living in cold and hot geographical areas are excluded from philosophical consideration because they are outside the zone of world history.

He emphasizes Hegel’s position, according to which strong cold forces are present inside cold and too hot areas, which "restrain the spirit to build the world". That is why he emphasized that Hegel’s ideas are "ungeographic (ungeographisch) and do not show an extension of the horizon to which geographical study must necessarily lead"; and that his ideas indicate a "delusion bordering on injustice to the nature of things"! (Ratzel, 1882: 32).

Russian (Soviet) geographers tried to apply dialectics on a materialist basis (Marxism), which gave very favourable results in the study of physical and biological elements of the landscape. VV Dokuchaev (1846-1903) had a special significance in the application of dialectical materialism in the domain of pedology, while VA Anuchin (1977) considered Hegel’s theory of the existence of historical and non-historical peoples, which is still used in various modifications, as a philosophical basis for racist pseudo doctrine. Namely, Hegel connected historical peoples with certain natural conditions (they coincide with certain territories), so he considered geography a science that deals with nature as the basis of the historical development of man and society. According to Anuchin, the shortcomings of Hegel’s methodology led to the study of nature being considered possible only in the form of a description of space, which was declared a task of geography. Regardless of this metaphysical principle, the power of the principle of dialectics, formulated by Hegel, had an impact on some geographers, which had a favourable effect on the development of geography.

Conclusion

Hegel’s contemporary reading opens up new geographical questions about the further development of the concepts of space, territory and state, which in the existing (neoliberal) conditions strongly affirm the expansion of capital accumulation on a global scale. Thus, capital continues its continuous movement, mainly in the direction of Hegel’s inner sun, sometimes stopping due to geographical adjustment and reconfiguration (e.g., the Balkans). This leads us further to postmodern geographies in which Lefebvre (1991) recognized the effects of the contradiction of capital and the "production of space." Perhaps the most important task today is for geographers (critics) to unravel these contradictions, and to recognize and explain new spaces.

Literature


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